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RUSH TO CLOSURE: LESSONS OF THE
TADIC JUDGMENT

Jose E. Alvarez*
"Courts try cases, but cases also try courts."
- Justice Robert Jackson1
In

1993

and

1994,

following allegations of mass atrocities, in

cluding systematic killings, rapes, and other horrific forms of vio
lence in Rwanda and the territories of the former Yugoslavia, two
ad hoc international war crimes tribunals were established to prose
cute individuals for grave violations of international humanitarian
law, including genocide.2 As might be expected, advocates for the
creation of these entities - the first international courts to prose
cute

individuals

under

international

law

since

the

trials

at

Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II - aspired to grand goals
inspired by, but extending far beyond, the pedestrian aims of ordi
nary criminal prosecutions. Those who pushed for the creation of
these tribunals argued that, as with earlier trials of major Nazi and
Japanese wartime leaders, properly conducted international crimi
nal trials, brought by and on behalf of the international community,
would: threaten those in positions of power to deter further vio
lence; make possible atonement for the perpetrators and honor the
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1977, Harvard; B.A.
(M.A.) 1979, Oxford; J.D. 1981, Harvard. - Ed. The author gratefully acknowledges com
ments received on portions and prior drafts of this article from Susan Damplo, Catharine
MacKinnon, Theodor Meron, Mark Osiel, Gerry Simpson, Eric Stein, and James Boyd
White. While some of these individuals would take issue with much of what is said here, their
challenging criticism proved invaluable. The author is also grateful for the continued finan
cial support provided by the University of Michigan Law School's Cook research fund.
1. Quoted in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PER
SONAL MEMOIR 45 (1992).
2. The war crimes tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established
by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council under its Chapter VII powers. See S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]; Report of th e Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 ofSecurity Council Resolu
tion 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of th e Secre
tary-Gen eral] (establishing the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and containing that
tribunal's statute); 3 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) [hereinafter !CTR Statute] (establishing the tribunal for Rwanda and containing that
tribunal's statute). The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established in The Hague, the
Netherlands, and the tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania.
This author uses "war crimes" to describe the offenses involved in the Rwandan and
Balkan prosecutions even though, as is clear from the statutes of these tribunals, the jurisdic
tion of each extends beyond violations of the laws and customs of war.
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dead; provide a mechanism to enable victims and their families to
receive needed psychological relief, identify remains, restore lost
property, and otherwise help heal wounds; channel victims' thirst
for revenge toward peaceful dispute settlement; affirm the
Nuremberg Principles at the international level while restoring faith
in the rule of law generally; tell the truth of what occurred, thereby
preserving an accurate historical account of barbarism that would
help prevent its recurrence; and, perhaps most important, restore
the lost civility of tom societies to achieve national reconciliation,3
This article reexamines these goals in light of the judgment is
sued after the first full trial at the Yugoslav tribunal, the case
against the Serb former cafe owner, Dusan "Dusko" Tadic.4 In my
view, the form, structure and content of this historic judgment sug
gest adherence to what Mark Osiel has characterized, in other con
texts, as a model of closure.5 Under this model, inspired by the
Nuremberg trials and subsequent criminal prosecutions for "admin3. This is a distillation of the goals most frequently articulated by the diplomats who
established these tribunals and the relevant epistemic co=unity of international lawyers.
For various views, see, for example, Provisional Verbatim Record ofthe Three Thousand 1lvo
Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 12-14, U.N. Doc. SI
PV.3217 (1993) (statement of Mrs. Albright, United States); Provisional Verbatim Record of
the Three Thousand One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th
mtg. at 8, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 {1993) (statement of Mr. Merimee, France) STEVEN R.
RA'INER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
lNTBRNATIONAL LAW 135-36 {1997); MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 214-28 {1997);
Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INTL. L.
325, 336-43 {1997); Payam Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A
Critical Juncture for the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 262 {1993); Richard J.
Goldstone, Conference Luncheon Address, Address Before the Minnesota Advocates for
Human Rights {Mar. 23, 1996), in 7 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTBMP. PRoas. 1 {1997); Theodor
Meron, Answering for War Crimes, FOREIGN AFF Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 2, 6-7 [hereinafter
Meron, Answering for War Crimes] ; Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yit
goslavia, FOREIGN AFF Su=er 1993, at 122 [hereinafter Meron, The Case for War Crimes
Trials]; Prosecuting and Defending Violations of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The Inter
national Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 88 ASIL PRoc. 239 {1994) [hereinafter Prosecut
ing and Defending Violations]; Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress, and Pardon:
Theoretical and Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTBRNA·
TIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 13-21 (Naomi Robt-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim As
sessment, 7 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTBMP. PROBS. 16, 19-20 (1997); Daphna Shraga & Ralph
Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUR. J. INTL. L. 501, 502-04
{1996); see also W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining
Public Order, 6 DUKE J. CoMP. & INTL. L. 175 (1995) {discussing seven fundamental goals of
legal systems designed to restore and maintain public order).
.,

.,

I

4. Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, Intl.
Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian
Law Committed i n the T erritory of F ormer Yugo. since 1991, May 7, 1997)
<http://www.un.org/icty/970507jt.htm> [hereinafter Tadic Judgment].
5. Mark Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 463, 486-88 (1995).
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istrative massacre[s]" in national courts, it is assumed that such pro
ceedings will draw upon "an already-existing consensus" regarding
"first principles" and evoke in participants and observers a sense of
social solidarity premised on the "common values" of Emile
Durkheim's "collective conscience."6
With respect to the Balkans and Rwanda, advocates of these
prosecutions start from the premise that such trials "assign guilt for
war crimes to the individual perpetrators . . . rather than allowing
blame to fall on entire groups and nations."7 Tribunal advocates,
commonly members of the "invisible college" of international law
yers,8 generally assume that only individual, not collective, attribu
tion of responsibility can terminate historical cycles of inter-group
bloodletting; that only by bringing individuals to the dock will vic
tims and survivors cease to "cry out for justice against the group"
and find closure.9 In the words of a former prosecutor at the
Yugoslav tribunal, Minna Schrag, by finding identifiable individuals
accountable, the rest of the community is not "associated with col
lective guilt ... ," and generations do not grow up saying "it's the
Serbs or the Croats or any other group that did this to my father
"10 It is also assumed that, by punishing the guilty- and only
•

•

•

•

the guilty- all of the other Nuremberg-inspired goals enumerated
above will thereby be advanced.
The recipe for emotionally cathartic closure as the mechanism
by which all these diverse goals are achieved is commonly grounded
in a victim-centered approach that blurs the lines between criminal
6. MARK OsrnL, MAss ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND nm LAW 22, 24 (1997)
(citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETY (George Simpson trans.,
1964)). This is an extended version of Osiel's article, Ever Again. See Osiel, supra note 5.
Osiel defines "administrative massacre[s]" as "large-scale violation[s] of basic human rights
to life and liberty by the central state in a systematic and organized fashion, often against its
own citizens, generally in a climate of war - civil or international, real or imagined." OsIEL,
supra, at 9. In both book and article, Osiel limits his discussion of closure to the role of
judges in evoking collective memory in such cases. Osiel does not address the significance of
closure with respect to the other goals of such trials, and he does not apply his insights to the
ongoing international prosecutions involving the Balkans and Rwanda.
7. Meron, Ans111ering for War Crimes, supra note 3, at 2-3; accord Kenneth Roth, Why
Justice Needs NATO, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 1997, at 21.
8. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College ofInternational La111yers, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 217
(1977).
9. Mary Ann Tetreault, Justice for All: Wartim e Rape and Women's Human Rights, 3
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 197 (1997) (quoting former Chief Prosecutor in the Balkan Tribunal
Richard Goldstone); see also Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to Search for
and Arrest War Criminals: Governm ent Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DuKE J. CoMP.
& INTI.. L. 411, 454 (1997) (quoting John Shattuck, then the top human rights officer at the
U.S. Department of State).

10. James Vescovi, Th e Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: An
Intervie111 111ith Minna Schrag '75, CoLUM. L. SCH. REP., Autumn 1996, at 27.
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punishment and civil redress and between utilitarian and retribu
tivist rationales for punishment.11 It is argued that international in
vestigations and criminal prosecutions will permit victims' families
and survivors to put the past to rest; that victims will channel their
anger and vent their frustrations through their testimony at trial be
cause, through participation as witnesses, they will be able to "reas
sert their sense of control and autonomy," enhance their dignity,
"lessen their isolation, and increase their feeling of belonging to a
community," and even "find some meaning in their victimiza
tion."12 The goal of using such trials to preserve an accurate collec
tive memory is also based on the model of closure. It is said that
war crimes trials permit entire societies to "draw[ ] a clear line be
tween past and future, allowing the beginning of a healing
process. "13
In this article, I argue that the trial of Dusko Tadic was con
ducted on the premise that Nuremberg-inspired goals would be fur
thered through the invocation of shared values in four distinct
areas:

(1) preservation of "common history judged by common

standards";14

(2)

application of "objective," "apolitical" rules of

law; (3) adherence to a "level playing field" for the defendant; and
(4) respect for the needs of victims. I show that TadiC's judges
sought, first, to render a verdict containing a definitive and endur
ing historical account that would be accepted as accurate, balanced,
complete and fair by all sides, including Serbs, thereby helping to
produce closure with respect to collective memory. Second, the
judges sought to remain above politics, in the mold of judges in
liberal states who purportedly act as mere interpreters of politically
neutral rules of law evenhandedly and objectively applied, regard
less of the political aspirations or the ethno-religious status of the
parties involved, thereby eliciting a satisfactory consensus based on
the application of the rule of law. Third, they attempted scrupu
lously to adhere to fair approaches to the admission of evidence
11. See Robt-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 16-21.
12. See id. at 19-21 (noting also how the mere verbalization of
tic psychological and therapeutic ends).

victimization serves cathar-

·

13. Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Introduction to IMPUNITY AND HUMAN R1mrrs, supra note 3, at
3, 7. Professor Robt-Arriaza thus argues, for example, that investigations and trials, because
they reveal the extent of repression, restore the reputation of innocent victims, constitute an
official condemnation of state-sanctioned abuses, make repetition of past mistakes less likely,
and permit societies to redefine themselves in light of real and not falsified history. See id. at
7-8 (noting how war crimes frequently demonstrate a "struggle for the control of history" and
arguing that criminal investigations "play[] a central role in a society's redefinition of itself'
and do not allow a former dictatorship's version of history "to be perpetuated in the military
academies or in textbooks").

14. See 0SIEL, supra

note 6, at 22.
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and its careful weighing under the presumption of innocence in or
der to elicit universal confidence in the procedural fairness ac
corded the defendant. Finally, they sought to provide closure to
TadiC's victims by according them a prominent role in the
proceedings.
Thereafter, I examine whether the judges' efforts succeeded in
these respects, using the conclusion of the first international war
crimes trial in fifty years as an occasion to reexamine the didactic
functions of such trials. I contend that the model of closure, and
certainly the version suggested by the Tadic judgment, is flawed and
may even undermine the grand aims articulated for the Yugoslav
and Rwanda tribunals. Yet I do not conclude that international war
crimes trials ought not be attempted generally or that the establish
ment of these two ad hoc tribunals was necessarily a mistake.
Rather, this article advances a different set of justifications for these
prosecutions, or at least a different set of criteria by which to judge
their "success." I propose here that these prosecutions not be
judged on the unattainable premises of closure, but on Mark Os1el's
alternative concept of "civil dissensus" wherein trials stimulate fur
ther dialogue regarding the issues on which they focus.15
Part I identifies how the model of closure has influenced the
establishment, structure, and operation of these tribunals. Part II
indicates how the Tadic judgment reflects that model. Part III
shows how TadiC's trial and conviction fall short of meeting clo
sure's demands in four vital respects, and concludes with more gen
eral reasons for skepticism about the likelihood of reaching closure
through ad hoc international tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Part IV argues for a discursive justification for these
tribunals and indicates, preliminarily, some of the implications of
this alternative approach.16
I.

CLosuRE

AND THE

NEw An

Hoc

TRIBUNALS

International lawyers have advanced many reasons why the in
ternational polity, or at least its most reputable representative, the
United Nations, should punish basic affronts to human dignity.17
They claim that the legal, political, and even moral choices have
been, to a considerable degree, settled by international law as
15. See OsIEL, supra note 6, at 41-48.
16. Readers who have little interest in the Tadic judgment as such or who have, from the
outset, grave doubts about the viability of "closure" may wish to proceed directly to Part IV.
17. These are further considered infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
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"shaped by the requirements of the international community."18
They argue that such a result is anticipated by the U.N. Charter and
its provisions for handling threats to and breaches of the interna
tional peace, and that the U.N., or at least its post-cold war Security
Council, now seems politically willing to establish such judicial fora
when the failure to prosecute presents a sufficient threat to the in
ternational order.19 These arguments have been premised on the
goal of generating "closure" for victims, defendants, and observers
both inside and outside the regions affected. The model of closure,
considered as a kind of Weberian "ideal type,"20 has provided the
single, coherent rubric to justify ad hoc international tribunals.
The policy justifications offered for international war crimes
tribunals build from the premise, discussed above, that public crimi
nal trials absolve those who are not in the dock. Given the imprac18. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that 50 years after Nuremberg, treaty and
case law developments in humanitarian law have shaped the minimum requirements for com
pliance and have helped to settle questions regarding investigation, prosecution, and com
pensation); see also KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE HAGUE 17-31 (1996); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent Inter
national Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 665, 707-10 (1996). There is,
however, an unresolved tension between the arguments for primacy of international fora when these are available - and other arguments that national authorities have a duty to
prosecute some international crimes under international law. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing that an international legal duty to prosecute ought to con
strain governments' resort to immunity); Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Sources in International
Treaties of an Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute and Provide Redress, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN R IGHTS, supra note 3, at 24, 24-38 (discussing sources of international law that sug
gest an obligation to investigate, prosecute, or provide redress). It seems that a national
authority's ostensible duty to prosecute does not result in any ostensible right to retain exclu
sive or primary jurisdiction over such prosecutions, at least not in the case of the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda.
19. After all, if Iraq's unwillingness to permit weapons inspections, Libya's failure to
transfer alleged terrorists to national courts, or the Haitian coup leaders' failure to abide by
the results of a U.N.-supervised election each justified a forceful Security Council response,
why not the continued impunity of alleged war criminals in the Balkans or Rwanda which
has, at a minimum, prompted destabilizing waves of refugees across international borders?
For the Yugoslav tribunal's response to a challenge to its establishment, see Decision on the
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber,
Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humani
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, Aug. 10, 1995) <http://
www.un.org/icty/970507jt.htm> [hereinafter Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction] ;
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (App. Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugo. since 1991, Oct. 2, 1995) <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeaUdecision-e/
acel.htm> [hereinafter Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal].
20. See generally MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Free Press 1964) (1�47). As Talcott Parsons
notes in his famous introduction to this work, Weber's concept of an "ideal type" consists of
an "abstract" and "generalized rubric within which an indefinite number of particular cases
may be classified." Talcott Parsons, Introduction to id. at 13.
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ticality of national venues for such trials as well as the comparative
merits of U.N. fora, advocates for these tribunals conclude that in
ternational criminal proceedings are best able to unite spectators whether or not involved in the conflict - in collective revulsion
against the barbarism of a few and in support of the civilized nature
of the trials themselves. International convictions, in short, are
viewed as best able to provide the cathartic group therapy necessary
to reestablish lost national

and international

consensus and, there

fore, peace.21 It is assumed that everyone will find the judgments
and verdicts of an international bench legitimate and that such uni
versal forums, issuing verdicts with universal legitimacy, will restore
lost civility - at least for the war-tom countries directly at issue
and, over the longer term, for the entire international community.
Yet to be successful, the model of closure requires fulfilling the
promise of the Nuremberg Principles while avoiding those charac
teristics of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that have been the tar
get of fifty years of criticism. These critiques, adequately surveyed
elsewhere,22 require only short summary here.
Prominent critics complain that the Nuremberg and Tokyo
processes were tainted by "victor's justice,"23 including procedures
and verdicts that were unfair to the defendants.24 Critics also ques21. For a characteristic attempt to link justice and peace, see, for example, Richard J.
Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Troth Commissions and International
Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. !Nn.. L. & PoL. 485, 486-90 (1996). Tue presumed link
between war crimes prosecutions and securing international peace goes back, of course, to
the Nuremberg trials themselves. See, e.g., D AVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 336 (1994)
(discussing how Nuremberg was seen as "the trial to end all wars").
22. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, supra note 21, at 335-91; SCHARF, supra note 3, at 3-17;
TAYLOR, supra note 1; Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of
Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DrcK. J. !Nn.. L. 57 (1995); Symposium,
1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability, 12 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 453, 453-544 (1996).

23. These include complaints that these tribunals' rules and bench and prosecution teams
were dominated by lawyers from the United States and arrogant notions of "American ex
ceptionalism;" that trials were marred by the application of double standards since no
charges were brought against the allies despite evidence that they also had violated interna
tional humanitarian law; and that the Allies' noble goals were compromised from the outset
since the very day that they signed the London Charter to establish the Nuremberg tribunal
the United States dropped its second nuclear bomb on Nagasaki. See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson,
War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 1, 4 (Tunothy L.H.
McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997).
24. These include accusations that defendants were convicted in absentia, while others
encountered trial by ambush - i.e., an expedited criminal process using unfamiliar rules and
based on documentary evidence primarily within the control of the prosecution with defense
lawyers accorded minimal time for preparation. Others have questioned the imposition of ex
post facto criminal liability, arguing that defendants were charged with newly minted interna
tional crimes, including "aggression" - premised dubiously on violations of the Kellogg
Briand Pact - "crimes against humanity," and other novel offenses having little basis in
many domestic legal systems, such as conspiracy. See, e.g., id. at 11-16; LUBAN, supra note 21,
at 349-52, 360-62.
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tion the premise that World War II trials did much to preserve col
lective memory in the service of history. To at least some, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trial records make for a fundamentally
flawed, even false, historical account that is grossly unfair to the
victims of the Holocaust and to the actual conduct of World War II.
With respect to Nuremberg's treatment of the Holocaust, some at
tribute the problem to the Allies' decision to make the waging of
"aggressive" war the linchpin of all the major trials at Nuremberg,
an approach that made the Holocaust incidental to the war instead
of making its horrors at least the equal focus of attention. By, for
example, arguing that Nazi concentration camps were effectively
tools of the German war effort and by failing to bring charges or
present evidence of Nazi crimes committed before the official onset
of interstate aggression, such as under German pre-1939 racial pu
rity laws, the trials of the major Nuremberg defendants obscured
the real scope and depth of the Holocaust while providing a funda
mentally misconceived account of German military strategy.25 By
encouraging the �heory that Nazi war criminals were merely an es
pecially �vii collection of gangsters bent solely on aggressive con
quest, the major Nuremberg trials glossed over the ethnic, religious,
and racial underpinnings of the Holocaust. In part because the tes
timonies of victims were deemed unnecessary, these proceedings
obscured the discriminatory animus that motivated the Nazis, ren
dering their anti-Semitism and homophobia, for example, less
prominent.26 By contrast, the Tokyo proceedings, along with the
more notorious proceeding against General Tomoyuki Yamashita
that reached the U.S. Supreme Court, have been criticized for
Even graver charges of overly hasty, and perhaps even racist, judgments have been lev
eled against the Tokyo trials. See, e.g., Dissentiilg Opinion of J. Pal, in 21 THB ToKYO WAR
CruMss TRIAL 1 -21 (R. Pritchard & S. Zaide eds., 1981); Ann Marie Prevost, Race and War
Crimes: Th e 1945 War Crimes Trial of Gen eral Tomoyuki Yamashita, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 303
(199 2) (arguing that Yamashita's trial, conducted in the immediate wake of Japanese aggres
sion, was thoroughly riddled with violations of fair process and tainted by racism); see also
Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INrL. L. & PoL. 373 (1991) .
25. See, e.g., Osiel, supra note 5, at 533 -36. But later trials by the Allies under the more
expansive terms of Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany went further. See
RA'INBR & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 47, 50.
26 . For an argument that it also rendered less evident how the Nazis were able to
bureaucratize their final solution, see, for example, LUBAN, supra note 21, at 365-74. A more
balanced portrayal of the Holocaust, it is said, has only emerged thanks to the work of later
historians and the trial records of proceedings more sensitive to the needs of victims, such as
Israel's prosecution of Eichmann. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L .R . 5 (Isr. D.C.
(Jm.) 1961) , 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) . These later accounts, in tum, have altered
modem-day recollections of the Nuremberg trials such that today those proceedings are
often cited as an affirmation of the horrors of crimes against humanity and not aggressive
war.
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presenting a racially charged, unnuanced account of atrocities com
mitted by Japanese troops in the Pacific theater.21
For the creators of the new ad hoc international tribunals, the

flaws suggested by these criticisms needed to be avoided if the
grand goals along the model of closure were to be achieved.28 To

avoid the accusation of "victor's justice," they took a number of
steps. They created denationalized entities established by the world
community, namely the U.N. Security Council, its General Assem

bly, and Secretary-General.29 To deflect charges of .double stan
dards, they attempted to ensure that all those who committed
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, regardless of na

tional origin, ethnicity, or religion, would be subject to prosecution

- and by an international bench and prosecution teams that would
not include persons from the region - presumptively tainted by

national bias - but would reflect, as does the International Court

of Justice, the full diversity of tJ:ie world's legal systems.

To avoid related accusations of unfairness, they incorporated

modern international human rights standards on behalf of criminal
defendants into the tribunals' respective statutes and rules of proce
dure and evidence.30 To level the playing field between prosecution
and defense, the tribunals borrowed considerably from the adver
sarial, oral nature of common law courtroom proceedings - includ
ing its procedures for cross examination - incorporated the

possibility ·of appeals, and even anticipated the need to train law

yers in this novel synthesis of common law and continental proce
dures.31 In response to the perceived illegitimacy of ex post facto
27. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Prevost, supra note 24, at 305; see also M.
Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 liARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 11, 36-37 (1997). For a
defense of the Yamashita case, see Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War
Crimes, 62 Mn L. REv. 1, 22-38 (1973).
28. See gen erally SCHARF, supra note 3, at 69-73; Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials,
supra note 3.
29. See Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 19, 'll 44. As
noted by the judges in the Tadic case, by securing the cooperation of the U.N. Secretariat as
well as the General Assembly, the tribunals' creators drew from the legitimacy of the in
dependent international civil service as well as the representativeness of the world's foremost
deliberative body.
30. See, e.g., !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 20 (providing for "rights of the accused"
comparable to those in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights);
ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 21 (same).
31. But note that the tribunals also borrowed from the civil law's tradition and permitted
appeals by the prosecution, a concept that has drawn criticism from those within the co=on
law tradition. See Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 25
DENY. J. INTI.. L. & PoLY. 305, 307 (1997) (suggesting that this "infringe[s] the accused's
interest in finality which underlies the double jeopardy principle"). The drafters of the rules
also departed significantly from common law traditions by permitting the use of hearsay evi..
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imposition of criminal liability, the creators of the Yugoslav tribunal
restricted that body's jurisdiction to crimes based on "rules of inter
national humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of cus
tomary law,"32 thereby limiting the tribunal's reach to international
crimes that, while arguably novel at the time of Nuremberg or
Tokyo, now have a fifty-year-old pedigree.
Gone from both tribunals were the aspects of the World War II
prosecutions most criticized from a modern human rights perspec
tive: the death penalty, liability for membership in a criminal or
ganization, and the possibility of trials in absentia.33 On the other
hand, measures for the counseling of victims, the protection of wit
nesses and court-ordered restoration of stolen property responded
to modern sensitivities favoring the rights of victims.34 Presumably
this new sensitivity to victims also responded to the criticism that
Nuremberg had
Holocaust.35

dishonored

the

memory

of

victims

of

the

But closure demands not merely a demonstrable commitment to
impartiality and procedural and substantive fairness: it requires
certainty of results, such that the tribunals' orders are enforced no
less than those of any court, and all perpetrators face a realistic
dence, by granting the tribunal the power to order the production of evidence, and by ban·
ning plea bargaining and prosecutorial grants of immunity. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 67.
32. ICTY Statute, supra note 2, 'l[ 34. For the approach taken by the Rwanda tribunal, see
infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
33. But see Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. since 1991, RULES
OF PROCEDURE AND EvmENCE, rule 61, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc. IT/
32/Rev. 1 (1994), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 2 (1994), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 3 (1995), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 4 (1995), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 5 (1995), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 6 (1995), U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev. 7 (1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 8 (1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 9 (1996),
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 10 (1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 11 (1997), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 12
(1997) (providing for public indictments in cases where arrest warrants are not executed)
<http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/revl3e.htm> [hereinafter ICTY Rules]. This article is
based on the 1995 revision, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 3.
34. For rules requiring the restitution of property and compensation to victims within the
Rwanda Tribunal, see !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 23; and Intl. Crim. Trib. for the Prose
cution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Intl. Humani
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda, RuLES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE,
rules 88(B), 105-06, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (1995).
35. Perhaps with the critique of Nuremberg's flawed history in mind, the prosecutors in
the first trial at the Yugoslav tribunal spent what seemed to some courtroom observers an
inordinate amount of time at the outset of the proceedings placing their case against Tadic
within the broader context of the recent history of the former Yugoslavia through testimony
on nationalist attitudes and their consequences, presented through an academic historian and
fourteen policy witnesses, none of whom had been eyewitnesses to any of the crimes alleged
in the indictment. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 120-37. As Scharf notes, for the first five
weeks of the Tadic trial, the prosecutors focused on proving the systematic and widespread
nature of ethnic cleansing without presenting any testimony as to the alleged crimes commit·
ted by the defendant. See id. at 137.
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prospect of becoming defendants. Accordingly, those who estab
lished the new ad hoc tribunals tried to replicate, despite the
absence of victor's justice, conditions prevailing among national
criminal courts in liberal states.36 While, ideally, closure demands
an Austinian sovereign authority capable of enforcing the law
against all,37 a precondition that is of course impossible to duplicate
within the present international system, tribunal creators achieved
the next best thing: tribunals backed by the power and resources of
the Security Council, with jurisdictional primacy over national
courts.
Consistent with the needs of closure, it is also argued - with
some success - that multilateral forces need to use force as neces
sary to arrest those whom local authorities refuse to give up,38 that
prosecutors courageously must indict at least the highest leaders re
sponsible regardless of the political repercussions, since the convic
tion of only inconsequential small fry will delegitimize the entire
process, and that tribunal orders need to be enforced directly on
recalcitrant government officials through renewed Security Council

sanctions if necessary.39 Proponents of closure argue further that
international criminal prosecutions need to reach deeply into all re
gions of Rwanda and the Balkans to identify and punish all those
who have been complicit with evil - even if such a thoroughgoing
search for the truth requires expensive trials far into the future, po-

36. Indeed, some hope that international criminal proceedings will help promote demo
cratic transitions. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINo, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 127-34 (1996);
OsraL, supra note 6, at 1.
The achievement of closure for victims, for defendants, and for society as a whole is, of
course, commonly associated with ordinary criminal trials in the United States. Cf. Frank
Rich, Rush to Closure, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A21 (ridiculing the notion that the trial of
Tunothy McVeigh, convicted of bombing the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in
1995, brings closure to concerns with respect to "right-wing fringe groups"). The headline for
Mr. Rich's column inspired the title of this article.
37. See Simpson, supra note 23, at 16-17.
38. In July 1997, in a change from its preexisting policy, NATO forces in Bosnia actively
began to seek out for arrest indicted war crimes suspects. This change in policy yielded some
arrests but also retaliatory attacks and threats by angered Bosnian Serb authorities. See
Mike O'Connor, Arrests by NATO Worry Bosnian Serb Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1997, at
A4; Mike O'Connor, Serbs Threaten Retaliation for War Crim e Arrests, U.N. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1997, at A6; see also Payam-Roman Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in
the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. Rrs. Q. (forthcoming Nov. 1998) (manuscript at 82-87, on
file with author). For a description of NAT O's earlier "monitor, but don't touch" policy, see
SCHARF, supra note 3, at 89.
39. See, e.g., CENrER FOR INTL. PROGRAMS, UNIV. OF DAYTON, BRINGING WAR
CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JusucE]; Meron,
Th e Case for War Crim es Trials, supra note 3, at 134; Roth, supra note 7.
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litically treacherous manhunts by international forces, and innova
tive adaptations to established extradition practices.40
Today, many international lawyers argue that the two ad hoc

international war crimes tribunals now in place "have genuinely ad

dressed many of the problems associated with their Nuremberg and
Tokyo predecessors."41

II.

CLOSURE APPLIED: THE TADIC JUDGMENT

After a trial that lasted nearly seven months, on May

7, 1997,

a

trial chamber of the Yugoslav tribunal found Dusko Tactic guilty on

eleven of thirty-one counts charged in the original indictment.42
40. See Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 94). Thus, an ad, placed in Th e New York
Times by the "Coalition for International Justice" shortly after NATO troops arrested one of
those indicted by the Balkan tribunal, urged that U.S.-led NATO forces meet their "moral
obligations" to bring the rest of those indicted to justice.
[S]o long as war criminals are at large and justice is not done, the wounds of war cannot
heal, refugees cannot return to their homes, and reconciliation, lasting peace, and a civil
society cannot be achieved in Bosnia. A successful exit for U.S. troops will not be possi
ble, and their many good works will have been wasted, if they leave behind a country in
which persons indicted for war crimes continue to wield significant power and make a
mockery of the rule of law.
Coalition for Intl. Justice, Advertisement, Mr. President: Order the Arrest of War Criminals
in Bosnia Now!, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at AS. The ad concludes:
Mr. President, at the dedication of the Holocaust Museum you reiterated the pledge
"never again" to permit genocide. If the War Crimes Tribunal and the quest for peace in
Bosnia should fail because U.S.-led NATO troops are unwilling to apprehend indicted
perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the civilized world will have lost the opportu
nity to restore some credence to this tarnished pledge. We appeal to you not to allow
this to happen.
Id. Among the groups in this coalition were Amnesty International, USA, and Human
Rights Watch. See also Roth, supra note 7 (arguing for the use of NATO troops to arrest
indicted war criminals). Indeed, some international lawyers contend that U.S. troops are
legally obligated to arrest war criminals in the Balkans. See, e.g., John F. Hector, Why US
Troops Must Arrest War Criminals, A.B.A. NATL. SEc. L. REP., Summer 1997, at 7 . But see
David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for th e Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM.
L.F. 401 (1994) ; Robert M. Hayden, Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and
Population Transfers, 55 SLAVIC REv. 727, 742-43 (1996) [hereinafter Hayden, Schindler's
Fate] ; Robert M. Hayden, Hayden's Reply, 55 SLAVIC REv. 767, 771 -72 (1996) ; [hereinafter
Hayden, Reply] ; Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law, NATL. INTEREST,
Wmter 1996 -97, at 41.
For a survey of the necessary adaptations to extradition, see, for example, Kenneth S.
Gallant, Securing th e Presence ofDefendants before th e International Tribunal for th e Former
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CR IM. L.F. 557 (1994).
41. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 185.
42. Although Tadic was acquitted of 20 counts, including all nine charges of murder, 11 of
these acquittals stemmed from the decision by two of the three judges that "grave breaches"
under Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention had not been shown because the prosecu
tion had failed to prove to the tribunal's satisfaction that the conflict in Bosnia was, after May
19, 1992, when all of TadiC's alleged offenses had occurred, an "international conflict." Tadic
Judgm ent, supra note 4, 'Jl'l( 607 -08. The majority found that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav
National Army at that time put the onus on the prosecution to prove Serbian "effective
control" over any offenses committed thereafter by forces of the Republic of Srpska (VRS).
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'Jl'll 584 -608. They concluded that the VRS needed to be shown
to be essentially agents of the Serbian army in order for their victims to be "protected per-
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Tactic, who had not been charged with genocide, was convicted of
"persecution" and fourteen beatings, designated as six crimes
against humanity and five violations of the laws or customs of war.43
On July 14, 1997, Tadic was sentenced to twenty years in prison.44
Observers predict that Tadic will probably serve at most ten years.45
As the following sections demonstrate, in judging and sentenc
ing Tadic, the judges attempt to provide an account of the history of
the region, the facts in the case, and the application of the law to
these facts in a way that closely adheres to the model of closure's
sons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention and that the prosecution had not met this evi
dentiary burden. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'l['l[ 607-08. Judge McDonald, from the
United States, dissented, indicating that she doubted whether "effective control" needed to
be shown and finding that even if that needed to be shown, the prosecution had met this
burden. Opinion and Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Re
garding the Applicability of Art. 2 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 'l[
4 (Trial Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola
tions of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, May
7, 1997) <http:l/www.unorglicty/970507jt.htm> [hereinafter McDonald Dissent].
As this suggests, the relatively large number of acquittals on the formal charges filed
against Tadic is deceptive. In most instances the original indictment had assigned three
counts to each separate act or series of acts by the accused: "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Conventions, "crimes against humanity" (namely persecution), and violations of the laws and
customs of war. Thus, most of the acquittals were based on rulings of law, not fact. Although
Tadic was acquitted by the majority of all charges of "grave breaches," many of the same
alleged actions led to successful convictions as violations of the laws of war and crimes
against humanity. Further, even though Tadic was cleared of all murder charges, the counts
under which he was convicted include involvement in the deaths of two Muslim policemen.
43. A charge involving forcible sexual intercourse against a female prisoner, designated
as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention, a violation of the laws or customs of war, and a
crime against humanity, was withdrawn before trial because the victim was unwilling to
testify.
44. Tadic was sentenced to a total of 97 years for the 11 separate convictions, but each of
these sentences was to be served concurrently, and the longest is for 20 years. See Sentencing
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Former Yugo. since 1991, July 14, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/su=ary/tadic.htm>.
Although in theory Tadic had faced the possibility of life imprisonment under the tribunal's
rules, see ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 101, this probably was not a realistic outcome given
the requirements in the tribunal's Statute that it "have recourse" to the "general practice"
regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, see ICTY Statute, supra
note 2, art. 24(1). While the issue of what "general practice" is in the former Yugoslavia is
not free from doubt, generally the maximum allowable sentence in the region is 20 years
imprisonment. See Dylan Cors & Siobhan K. Fisher, National Law in International Criminal
Punishment: Yugoslavia's Maximum Prison Sentences and th e United Nations War Crimes
Tribunal, 3 PARKER SCH. J.E. EuR. L. 637, 660-62 & n.110 {1996).
45. Both the defendant and the prosecutor have filed appeals to the judgment. See
Notice of Appeal of Judgment of May 7, 1997 by the Defence, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-1-T {App. Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations on Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since
1991, June 3, 1997) <http:l/www.un.org/icty/p210-e.htm> [hereinafter Defence Notice of Ap
peal]; Notice of Appeal of Judgment of May 7, 1997 by the Prosecutor, Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-T {App. Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations on Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former
Yugo. since 1991, June 6, 1997) <http:l/www.un.org/icty/p210-e.htm>.
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demands in four critical respects. First, they try to fulfill the de
mand for a definitive historical account that preserves the history of
barbarism. Second, they resort to the law's apolitical neutrality and
rely on its objectivity to make both factual and legal determina
tions, the better to highlight the contrast between the court's politi
cally neutral treatment of the defendant as compared to the
defendant's actions of persecution. Third, they repeatedly rely on
concepts like the presumption of innocence to illustrate how closely
and scrupulously they respect the defendant's rights to a "level
playing field." Finally, the judges acknowledge the innocence of
victims in both their historical accounts as well as in their applica
tion of the rules of humanitarian law.
A.

Preserving Collective Memory

The judgment's initial background and preliminary findings
chronicle the historical and geographic background of Bosnia's
multi-ethnic milieu, the disintegration of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, political developments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the rise of a propaganda campaign in favor of eth
nic cleansing for the good of "Greater Serbia," the formation of
Serb autonomous regions, the transformation of the Yugoslav
National Army (JNA) into the instrument of Serbia and
Montenegro, the rise of the army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) in
the face of the JNA's withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and the effects within Bosnia, along ethnic lines, of the JNA's incur
sion into Croatia.46 These sections present an equally detailed ac
count of the immediate history of the region in which Tactic's
actions occurred, Opstina Prijedor, including the breakdown in eth
nic relations there in the face of the "polarizing effect" of "propa
ganda and political manoeuvres" intended "to shift the balance of
power

in

the former Yugoslavia to Serbia."47 The judgment also

provides an account of the Serbian takeover of the town of Prijedor
and its grim consequences.48
This historical account, common to judgments involving admini
strative massacres, aspires to be the common history judged by
common standards that the model of closure demands with respect
to the preservation of "collective memory."49 It is a painstaking
46. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 53-126.
47. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 'll 130-92.
48. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 137-41.
49. Osiel defines the term as collections of historical stories that permit societies to draw
co=on lessons for the future, namely, tales that "a society tells [itself] about momentous
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attempt to provide a definitive, historically accurate account not
merely of TadiC's actions but of the immediate context in which
these occurred. This historical section of the judgment appears to
be intended to stand on its own, as a testament to how hate was
permitted to consume a particular region. While it does not directly
relate to the crimes charged, it seems intended to be a chronicle of
the past that seeks to put the past to rest. The judges assume that
their unflinching account of Serbian aggression against non-Serbs,
replete with graphic descriptions of the severe torture, executions,
sexual assaults, and beatings endemic to camps holding mostly
Muslim and Croat civilians, along with the nearly ceaseless ethnic
and religious epithets that encouraged and accompanied these hor
rific conditions, will repel ordinary readers.so
The judges' historical chronicle is also intended to lend credibil
ity to their subsequent findings with respect to the defendant. After
all, if Serbs in this region were being encouraged to treat non-Serbs
as sub-human and were in fact doing so, would it be particularly
surprising if Tadic, a vitriolic supporter of "Greater Serbia," en
gaged in the same? At the same time, these preliminary findings
imply that Serbian actions in

1991-92

and, by inference, TadiC's as

well, were extreme in both cruelty and motivation, especially within
the context of the formerly harmonious interethnic relations in the
former Yugoslavia.

The judges contrast the state of affairs in

1991-92 in Prijedor before the

Serbian takeover - portrayed as a

town where various ethnic groups lived in apparent harmony
amidst significant intermarriages and friendships across ethnic lines
with limited signs of division51 - with its post-invasion state in
stark terms, drawing sharp black-and-white distinctions between
good and evil, aggressor and victim. Readers are discouraged from
seeing the underlying events as in any sense a continuation or exac
erbation of older conflicts, but, at the same time, no one except the
defendant is assigned specific blame.
The judges' findings, only nominally preliminary, are presented
in a matter-of-fact tone that acknowledges little self-doubt or possievents in its history, the events that most profoundly affect the lives of its members and most
arouse their passions for long periods.'' OsIEL, supra note 6, at 18-19.
50. Thus, the judgment includes the statement of an elected Serb official who indicated in
the media that he would no longer allow non-Serb women to give birth at the local hospital,
that all mixed marriage couples should be divorced or face annulment, and that children of
such marriages "were good only for making soap." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 147.
51. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 129. The judgment also quotes one witness who
describes Prijedor as the symbol of the "brotherhood unity of the former Yugoslavia at
large.'' Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 129.
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bility of partiality. The judges tell a simple, linear story, presented
as if it were an objective press account that would presumably be
found credible by anyone, regardless of ethnicity or political sympa
thies. Their account relies on only those adverse inferences about
Serbian motivations that, in the Chamber's view, any reasonable
observer would draw. The judges do not render any outwardly
valuative judgments with respect to Serbian nationalist goals, and
they are careful to avoid any suggestion that all Serbs, even in
Prijedor, are complicit in the mass atrocities they describe. This is
strongly confirmed by the rest of the judgment which is devoted to
showing, in elaborate detail, why Tadic, as an individual, is guilty of
certain specific offenses.

B. The Factual Case Against the Defendant
From broad historical context, the judgment proceeds to a de
tailed enumeration of the accusations against Tadic, the evidence
bearing on these, and the judges' findings with respect to all thirty
one counts charged in the indictment.52 The judges describe Tadic's
ever more prominent nationalistic sentiments, use of ethnic epi
thets, and political activities, both as a reserve police officer and,
most crucially, at the Omarska, Keraterm, and Tmopolje prison
camps.53 They find that Tadic: (1) participated in the attack on
Kozarac;54

(2) beat non-Serb civilians there, at the Prijedor military
(3)

barracks, and in the Omarska and Keraterm prison camps;ss and

assisted in the seizure, selection, and transportation of individuals
for detention.56 As in the historical section of the judgment, this
section does not flinch from describing, in graphic detail, what
Tadic is alleged to have done. All trial observers, Serb and non
Serb alike, are invited to join in the judges' horror, the better to
join the societal consensus in favor of the ultimate verdict.
In one respect, however, this portion of the judgment differs
sharply from the judges' preliminary findings.

Although that

historical overview adopts an authoritative tone, with little refer
ence to the evidence that led its authors to their conclusions, in this
section the judges enumerate in detail each witness and document
introduced, connecting these to each of the charges against the de52. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 193-556. Fo r the tribunal's disposition of each
count charged, see Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 'll 2 03-04.
53. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 'll 2 07-28.
54. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'Jl'll 396-97.
55. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 397, 426-35, 444-48.
56. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 453-59.
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fendant. They indicate, through detailed findings, precisely why
they find one version of the facts more credible than another. The

testimonies of individual prosecution and defense witnesses are
canvassed, and the judges identify which witness put the defendant
on the scene - despite the defense's denial that, for example, Tadic
was ever present in the Omarska prison camp - as well as which
witness claims to have seen Tactic commit the alleged acts. Repeat

edly, the judges indicate that the presumption of innocence means
that evidence that Tactic was present at the scene of particular as
saults or other crimes is, by itself, insufficient to convict.57
The differences between the historical and defendant-centered

sections of the judgment are readily understandable. The historical

portions of the judgment are largely drawn from the prosecution's
academic/policy witnesses, whom the defense, for its own reasons,
decided not to rebut and barely to cross-examine.58 Under a system

that largely relies on the parties and not the judges to contest evi
dence, uncontested evidence is much more likely to emerge un

scathed in the subsequent judgment.59 On the other hand, once the

judges reach what both prosecution and defense consider to be the

heart of the case - the specific charges against Tadic - on which
there is conflicting evidence, they clearly believe that a careful ac
counting of the evidence is necessary to legitimize their conclusions.

With respect to every charge, Tactic relied on what his defense

team characterized - misleadingly - as an alibi defense. Defense

witnesses testified that Tactic was living in Banja Luka, some forty
five kilometers from Kozarac and further from Prijedor, from May

23

through June

15, 1992;

that he made only four trips from Banja

Luka; and that, thereafter, he lived in Prijedor while working as a
reserve traffic policeman.60 According to the defense, Tadic was

57. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 237 (finding insufficient evidence that Tadic
took an active part in the assault and mutilation' of Flkret Harambasic); Tadic Judgment,
supra note 4, 'll 241 (finding insufficient evidence that prisoners died of the injuries alleged).
The Chamber rejected, however, the defense claim that, as a matter of law, a finding of guilt
cannot rest on the testimony of a single witness. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 256,
535-39.
58. Defense cross-examination of these witnesses was largely restricted to contesting the
description of the underlying conflict as international. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 120-37.
59. The Tadic defense team's relatively nonconfrontational approach to the prosecution's
presentation of relevant history, was, for example, very different from the approach taken by
lawyers for Klaus Barbie who attempted to put modem French history itself on trial. See,
e.g., OsIEL, supra note 6, at 52-53.
60. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 481. For an overview of the defense's case, see
note 3, at 175-206.

ScHARF, supra
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simply not present at Kozarac or in the relevant prison camps at the
time of each of the alleged offenses.61
To the extent the judges reject this defense with respect to spe
cific charges, they do not indicate that they find defense witnesses
untruthful. Instead, the judges respectfully and cautiously conclude
that defense witnesses merely failed to provide a conclusive alibi,
since even if what they said was true, their testimony did not pre
clude TadiC's presence elsewhere.62 Even with respect to the weigh
ing of competing testimony, the judges strive to cast their findings
as the inevitable result of the application of coolly unemotional, ra
tional, and objective logical iµference and not subjective - and
presumably more challengeable - credibility determinations.63
The search for societal consensus with respect to their verdict also
leads the judges to tiptoe gingerly around the question of the poten
tial ethnic or religious bias of all witnesses, an issue that emerged
repeatedly during cross-examination of the Serbian defense wit
nesses and the non-Serb prosecution witnesses - most of whom
were Muslim victims.64
The Chamber's sensitive handling of evidence seeks to elicit
confidence that the judges are being apolitical and are not being

61. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 443 (relating to Tadic's claim that he was not
present at the Keraterm camp).
62. Even with respect to events at the Omarska camp on June 18, 1992, the Chamber
simply states that "no other Defence witness could assign 18 June as a date when the accused
was in his or her company." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 230; see also Tadic Judgment,
supra note 4, ']['][ 312-13. Of course, as the judgment readily acknowledges, an alibi defense in
this case became nearly impossible given the need to account for TadiC's whereabouts over
an extended period. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 533. Pointing to the many prosecu
tion witnesses who put Tadic on the scene in Omarska on June 18, the Chamber appealed to
logical inference, indicating that "it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, '][ 234. With respect to other charges, the chamber
counters the "general" testimony of defense alibi witnesses, who testify of the accused's
"constant" presence elsewhere, with the "very specific and precise evidence" of certain
prosecution witnesses who testify to TadiC's actions on particular occasions. Tadic Judgment,
supra note 4, 'lI 278 (relating to events of July 10, 1992); see also Tadic Judgment, supra note 4,
']['][ 434-35 (relating to TadiC's presence at the Omarska camp).
63. Presumably not to offend Serbian sensibilities and to find common ground in support
of the judgment, the judges avoid saying that many defense witnesses, including the accused's
wife, Mira Tadic, are not credible. Indeed, at various points, the judges go out of their way to
rely on Mira TadiC's testimony, thereby suggesting that they find at least portions of it credi
ble. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 428. Thus, the judges do not accuse the de
fense's four alibi witnesses, all of whom testify that Tadic was present in Kozarac in May
1992, of lying; the judges simply state that their testimony "does not afford an alibi to the
accused except to indicate that they did not happen to see the accused in Kozarac on that day
while they were there." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, '][ 337.
64. The judges deemphasize the possible significance of ethnic or religious bias by any
witness. They dismiss defense contentions that Muslim victims are inherently biased and
avoid similar contentions with respect to the veracity of defense witnesses. See Tadic Judg
ment, supra note 4, ']['][ 540-41.
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drawn into local ethnic or religious tensions. At the same time, the
judges emphasize that, under the applicable law, they are obliged to
find evidence that Tadic was personally motivated by and acted
upon the systematic nationalist ethno-religious hatreds canvassed in
the judges' preliminary findings. The tribunal links Tadic's intent to
those of the Serbian society at large in three steps. First, the judges
cite their preliminary findings, along with other evidence, to con
clude that TadiC's acts were taken within a "general context of dis
crimination." 65 Second, they rely on specific examples of
victimization of non-Serbs to conclude that "[a] policy to terrorize
the non-Serb civilian population of opstina Prijedor on discrimina
tory grounds is evident[,] . . . that its implementation was wide
spread and systematic throughout," and that this was apparent "at
the minimum" in Opstina Prijedor.66 Finally, the Chamber links
these general policies to TadiC's own actions to conclude that Tadic
was "aware of the policy of . . . discrimination against non-Serbs,
and acted on the basis of religious and political grounds."67
C.

The Legal Case Against the Defendant

In the final section of the judgment, the Chamber applies the
applicable humanitarian law to its factual findings. The judges con
firm that, as a matter of law, a showing of discriminatory animus on
the part of Tadic individually and by advocates of "Greater Serbia"
generally is needed to convict Tadic of either persecution as a crime
against humanity or violations of the laws and customs of war. Af
firming that convictions for violations of the laws or customs of war

65. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 465.
The abuses against non-Serbs were motivated by religious and political reasons. The
curse directed at Muslims most often was the derogatory term, "balija," as well as "Fuck
your Alija," referring to the SDA leader Alija Izetbegovic. These indicate the motiva
tions of the perpetrators. Abuse was also directed towards Croats for political reasons.
There was repeated testimony that men were forced to hold their hands in the three
finger Serb salute, which is a traditional Serb greeting and has meaning within the
Serbian Orthodox Church, and several witnesses testified that crosses were carved on
men's bodies. Numerous witnesses testified to hearing discriminatory curses such as
"balija mother," "Ustasa mother," and "Alija mother," usually in association with a
beating. Many were required to sing Serb nationalistic songs and some of the camp
guards wore the "Chetnik kokarda," the two-headed eagle described as equivalent to
wearing a Nazi swastika.
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 467.
66. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 472.
67. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 477. For the Chamber, this evidence includes Tadic's
active involvement in political affairs on behalf of a "Greater Serbia," including TadiC's re
puted desire to name his child after Slobodan Milosevic, his many actions and statements
directed against Muslims and his evincing a desire to "disturb relations between ethnic
groups." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 475 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 185.
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and for crimes against humanity require, apart from a demonstra
tion that the acts allegedly committed are within those enumerated
under those laws, that they be committed within the context of
"armed conflict,"68 the judges find that these requisites are met
since Tadic's actions relating to the take-over of Kozarac and other
villages were directly connected to this "ethnic war and the strategic
aims of the

Republika Srpska

to create a purely Serbian State."69

Similarly, they conclude that Tactic's actions in the prison camps
were also directly connected to the ongoing armed conflict, since
they "clearly occurred with the connivance or permission of the au
thorities running these camps" and "effected the objective of the

Republika Srpska

to ethnically cleanse, by means of terror, killings

or otherwise, the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
controlled by Bosman Serb forces."70
In the tribunal's view, discriminatory animus is also a significant
component with respect to each of the additional requirements
needed under the law for a "crime against humanity."71 They con

firm that discriminatory intent is, as would be expected, crucial to
determining that the accused committed the specific type of crime
against humanity charged under article S(h) of its statute, "persecu
tion." Though the chamber candidly admits that persecution "has
68. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 'll 572-76.
69. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 574.
70. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 575.
71. According to the chamber's interpretation of article S's reference to "crimes against
humanity," these crimes require, in addition, a showing: (1) that at the time of the commis
sion of the acts or omissions there was an ongoing widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population; (2) that the defendants' acts were undertaken on a widespread
or systematic basis and in furtherance of such a policy; (3) that all relevant acts be under
taken on discriminatory grounds; and (4) that the perpetrator have knowledge of the wider
context of his actions. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 626. The judges determined that
the need to have actions "directed against a civilian 'population"' requires a widespread
course of conduct, suggesting a large number of victims, or systematic mass action, suggesting
a pattern or methodical plan, and not "isolated or random" acts. Tadic Judgment, supra note
4, 'll 646. In addition, persons must be "victimised not because of [their] individual attributes
but rather because of [their] membership [within] a targeted civilian population." Tadic
Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 644. In deference to the Report of the Secretary-General that
recommended that the Security Council establish the Yugoslavia tribunal, the judges affirm
that "discrimination" is required and must rest on "national, political, ethnic, racial or reli
gious grounds." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 652. They also agree that the acts must be
part of a formally adopted, or at least consciously pursued, policy directed against particular
groups of people, whether or not pursued by a state. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 653.
As for the defendant's intent, they require a showing that
the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts were occur
ring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for purely personal
motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population . . . . Therefore the
perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his
act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict.
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 659.
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never been clearly defined in international criminal law nor . . . in
the world's major criminal justice systems,"72 it indicates "that what
is necessary is some form of discrimination that is intended . to be
and results in an infringement of an individual's fundamental
rights" based on the specific grounds of "race, religion or poli
tics."73 The judges contend that "it is not necessary to have a sepa
rate act of an inhumane nature to constitute persecution" since
discrimination, the "violation of the right to equality in some seri
ous fashion," "itself makes the act inhumane."74
The Chamber's reliance on discriminatory animus as a critical
part of both its factual and legal arguments in favor of conviction
serves a multitude of didactic purposes. First, it is an affirmation of
and an appeal to universal values in defense of fundamental human
dignity. The judges are relying on the closure model's premise that
such a judicial affirmation will demonstrate, to everyone's satisfac
tion, that it is appropriate - and perhaps necessary - to have an
international tribunal pronounce on crimes that constitute universal
threats.75 Second, their emphasis on irrational prejudice as the mo
tivator encourages condemnation of Tadic as an individual culprit
and mollifies the victims of his irrational, but calculated, behavior.
Third, as in the Chamber's factual findings, it heightens the sharp
break between the defendant's treatment of his victims· and the
judges' treatment of him. Fourth, by stressing the ethnic and reli
gious underpinnings of the conflict in the Balkans in a way that the
Nuremberg trials largely failed to do, the judges attempt to
strengthen the accuracy of their historical account and thereby pre
serve a record that does not dishonor the memory of the Balkan
72. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 694.
73. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 697; see also Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 707
(noting that forms of persecution vary, but the prerequisite for all is discrimination with re
spect to a "fundamental right").
74. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 697. Although the chamber does not attempt a defini
tive list of acts that would constitute persecution, it surveys the wide variety of acts that have
been included in the literature or in prior practice, including Nuremberg itself - from killing
to limitation of the type of professions open to the targeted group, from restrictions on family
life to infia=atory writings inciting a population to anti-Semitic persecution - and con
cludes that the crime encompasses "a variety of acts, including, inter alia, those of a physical,
economic or judicial nature, that violate an individual's right to the equal enjoyment of his
basic rights." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 710; see also Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 'll
707-09.
75. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 17-21 (discussing need for international fora).
Thus, for example, the requirement that crimes against humanity be directed at "any civilian
population . . . gives the crime the requisite international dimension and . . . permits extrater
ritorial prosecution, thus distinguishing it from an 'ordinary crime' that the state is expected
to prosecute." The Queen v. Fmta [1994] S.C.R. 701, 752 (Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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conflict's victims. Finally, the judges' unstinting account of the eth
nic and religious stereotyping engaged in by Tadic and the society
around him seeks to promote revulsion against such tactics and en
courages societal consensus in favor of national reconciliation along
integrationist lines.
As the foregoing example illustrates, the Tadic judgment as well
as his sentencing76 wholeheartedly embrace the closure model. The
purportedly authoritative and lengthy77 historical account that the
judges supply in their preliminary factual :findings, extending to
facts and situations far removed from the charges directly at issue,
presents a wealth of detail intended to evoke shared revulsion in
court observers - the better to prevent barbarism's recurrence, to
promote sympathy and solidarity with victims, and to strengthen
the court's moral and legal legitimacy vis-a-vis Tadic and defend
ants generally. Those findings are also intended to lend credibility
to the court's later factual and legal conclusions, and not merely
because the court's version of history helps it to determine that the
law's demand for a demonstration of discriminatory animus has
been fulfilled. The black-and-white lines drawn by the court be
tween perpetrator and victim and between the region's harmonious
past and its recent decline into ethnic cleansing are intended to but
tress the court's :findings of guilt, to strengthen social solidarity on
behalf of the universal values reflected in humanitarian law, and to
support as well TadiC's sentence. At the same time, the apolitical
tone adopted in those preliminary factual findings - as in the
court's scrupulous attempt to avoid explicit condemnation of
Serbian political goals, Serbian political or cultural institutions or
Serbs generally - keeps the focus on TadiC's individual culpability,
76. Tadic's sentencing, as reported in the press, included an oral statement by Chief Judge
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald. As quoted in news accounts, Judge McDonald noted that Tadic
beat his Muslim and Croat victims "intentionally and with sadistic brutality, using knives,
weapons, iron bars, the butt of a pistol, sticks and by kicking . . . tightening a noose around
the neck of one of them until he lost consciousness. Why?" War Criminal Sentenced to
20-Year Term, CliARLESToN DAILY MAIL (yV. Va.), July 14, 1997, at AS, available in 1997 WL
7110580. Judge McDonald also alluded to political leaders' encouragement of ethnic hatred
and indicated to Tadic, "[y]ou responded to this campaign and you must bear responsibility
for your criminal conduct." Id. She concluded that "[t]o condone your actions even when
committed in this context is to give effect to a base view of morality and invite anarchy." Id.
Judge McDonald's statements, including her presumably rhetorical question to the defend
ant, were obviously intended to enhance collective revulsion against Tadic's acts and en
courage unanimity in favor of the severity of the chamber's sentence. See also Sentencing
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, Intl. Trib. For the Prose
cution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, July 14, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/
70714se2.htm> (hereinafter Sentencing Judgment).
77. The preliminary factual findings extend from paragraph 193 of the judgment to para
graph 477 in an opinion that has 765 paragraphs total.
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the better to avoid destabilizing implications of collective guilt. Fi
nally, the court's careful delineation of evidence relative to particu
lar charges, along with its effort to reduce reliance on credibility or
other comparable "subjective" findings, seeks to promote closure
with respect to the judges' adherence to the neutral application of
law. In all these respects, Tadic's trial and judgment seem, as in
tended, at least the equal of the Nuremberg trials that inspired
them.

III.

CRACKS IN

THE

EDIFICE

To date, the reaction to TadiC's conviction and sentence does not
resemble anything remotely approaching closure. Despite the me
ticulous case presented by the prosecution, the relatively strong de
fense mounted by Tadic's attorneys, the more than

120

witnesses

and hundreds of exhibits, the 7000 pages of trial transcripts, and the
painstaking and lengthy written judgment, the Tadic verdict has
generated, at least in Serbian circles, chilly indifference or worse.78
The official Serbian reaction has been that the Tadic proceedings
and verdict constitute further evidence that the tribunal is a fraud
perpetrated by hostile foreign interests pursuing political show tri
als to undermine the Serbian nationalist cause.79 This reaction,
while extreme, is likely to find an echo even among some commen
tators in the West.80 And, while most international lawyers con78. See, e.g., Madise Simons, A War-Crimes Trial, but ofMuslims, Not Serbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1997, at A3. See generally Dufan Cotic, Introduction, 5 CruM. L.F. 223 (1994). The
reaction to Tadic's conviction and sentence was, within the Balkans, strongly divided along
Serb/non-Serb lines. The deputy justice minister of the Bosnian Serb republic at Pale, Goran
Neskovic, expressed the view of many Serbian observers when he pronounced that the Tadic
sentence proved the tribunal's "bias against Serbs." Mike Corder, Tribunal Sentences
Bosnian Serb to Serve 20 Years for Terror Campaign, WASH. PoST, July 15, 1997, at Al3.
According to Neskovic, "Tadi[c] was convicted only because he lived in Prijedor . . . . That
man is not guilty, and not a single witness could confirm that he was responsible." Id. In
deed, the absence of Serbian support for the Yugoslav tribunal, long apparent given the lack
of cooperation, indeed obstruction, by government officials and others to the tribunal's ongo
ing investigations, only seemed to deepen after the verdict was rendered and NATO forces
undertook two modest raids to arrest other indicted individuals. Instead of closure, bomb
and other threats emerged as a resnlt of the verdict and the NATO actions, and Serbian
media reports lambasted both the verdict and the NATO actions as biased attacks on the
Serbian cause. See Jovana Gee, Serb Anger Grows due to NATO Raid, Tribunal Sentencing,
AssocIATED PRESs, July 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4874854; see also Jovana Gee, Serbs
Bury War Crimes Suspect, Accuse NATO ofMurder, AssoCIATED PRESS, July 13, 1997, avail
able in 1997 WL 4874729.
79. Indeed, Serbian anti-tribunal propaganda has been so vitriolic that it prompted
NATO attempts to disrupt television transmissions within Bosnia. See, e.g., Chris Hedges,
NATO Troops in Bosnia Silence Karadzic's [sic] Television Station, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997,
at A3.
80. See, e.g., Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 743; Hayden, Reply, supra note
40, at 767; Rubin, supra note 40, at 41-42.
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tinue to applaud the tribunal's efforts, its proceedings are
generating considerable and contentious debates and reviving
Nuremberg-era issues even among its foremost advocates.81 There
is little evidence that either the principal intended audience of the
closure model - the diverse peoples living within the former
Yugoslavia - or the international community as a whole are reach
ing consensus in or through the tribunal's efforts. On the contrary,
as with Nuremberg and national war crimes prosecutions since, it
seems likely that many revisionists are now waiting in the wings and
will soon emerge to challenge the tribunal's legitimacy and its ca
pacity to fulfill its goals.
While it remains possible that closure will yet emerge as a result
of the Yugoslav prosecutions, we need to consider the possibility
that, at least in. the context of present conditions in the former
Yugoslavia, the model of closure needs reconsideration. In this sec
tion, I will address how, despite the Tadic judges' best efforts,
TadiC's trial fell short with respect to the four critical aspects of the
model of closure: the presentation and preservation of collective
memory, the application of "apolitical" rules of law, and fairness to
both defendants and victims. At the end of the section, I will sug
gest why the difficulties in applying the model of closure are not
limited to either the Tactic case or the Yugoslav tribunal but extend,
possibly with even greater force, to the international tribunal for
Rwanda. Finally, I will suggest why the failures of the closure ap
proach suggest a need to get beyond the purported "lessons" of
Nuremberg.
A. Flawed History
Consider first the contrast between the demands for a definitive
and enduring historic account acceptable to all sides and what
Tactic's judges actually produced: a simple story of Serbian aggres
sion and its horrific consequences. The judges' account, containing
scarcely a mention of the possibility of competing versions of events
or shades of gray, lacks the complexities, nuances and cross
disciplinary insights of contemporaneous scholarly accounts of the
same events. As might be expected, scholars' versions of the
81. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 3, at 207-28; Chaney, supra note 22, at 60; Monroe
Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INTL.
L. 235 (1996); Scharf, supra note 31; Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The International Trial
of the Century? A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribuna� 29 CORNELL INn.. L.J. 635, 643-63 (1996); Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic Sentencing
Judgement: A Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 26 GA. J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 263 (1997).
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Balkans' descent into violence are much more nuanced.

Even

while finding the Serbs primarily at fault, they give the conflict a
much longer and more complex pedigree, highlighting the ways that
economic and other forms of discontent, for example, were chan
neled first under Tito and then Milosevic and other politicians. The
best of these accounts tells a story quite distinct from the Tadic
judges' simplistic tale of an ethnically harmonious region that,
nearly overnight, exploded into ethnic cleansing. Academic histo
ries, such as Sabrina Ramet's and Noel Malcolm's, bring to bear a
rich texture of cultural, psychological, sociological, and political
facts, along with their historical precedents, to explain how the so
cial fabric of the former Yugoslavia frayed over time.82 Unlike the
tale told in the Tadic case, these accounts: (1) distinguish among
cultural, religious, and political phenomena instead of relying on an
undifferentiated mantra of race, religion, or politics; (2) scrutinize
and challenge the numerous claims to historical victimization con

(3) attribute blame to a large
number of specific persons and groups, including churches and

tained in regional nationalisms; and
political associations.83

In these and many other ways, TadiC's judges are demonstrably
poor historians. It seems inconceivable that anyone, even those fa
vorably disposed to the judges' version of the facts, can read the
judges' historical account as a convincing or definitive history. De
spite the Yugoslav tribunal's and its prosecutor's able attempts to
exceed the level of historical accuracy achieved at the Nuremberg
trials, their effort to seek closure with respect to the preservation of
collective memory seems both a Sisyphean effort and a pale and
woefully inadequate version of a story better told elsewhere.
Some of the reasons for this lie with the traditional demands of
the

criminal

law.

As

scholars

like

Osiel

have

noted,

the

perpetrator-driven nature of the rules of evidence, the require82. See SABRINA PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL: THE DISINTEGRATION OF
YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE DEATH OF Trro TO ETHNIC WAR (2d ed. 1996); NoEL MALcoLM,
BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996).
83. See MALcoLM, supra note 82; RAMET supra note 82. Although Ramet does not rely
on atavistic ethnic hatreds to explain recent massacres, she describes the various ways institu
tions, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, and individuals, such as Milosevic, journalists,
and rock stars, revived and exploited nationalist sentiments that go back at least to 1918.
Separate chapters in Ramet's book are devoted to "distinct spheres of influence" - culture
and society, religion, and politics - and she chronicles, for example, the forms of "victim
complex" that became manifest within each sphere. See RAMET, supra note 82, at 91-112,
198-200; see also id. at 275-98 (discussing the "[r]epercussions of the War in religion, gender
relations, and culture"). Malcolm's is a more traditional historical account which begins with
the origins of racial myths in Bosnia in 1180 and takes readers through distinct historical
periods until modem times. See generally MALcoLM, supra note 82.
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ments of the substantive law, and the respective roles, as tradition
ally conceived, of prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge, suggest
the need to draw bright lines that are often - perhaps usually inconsistent with the rendering of a nuanced history.84 From the
perspective of TadiC's judges, to emphasize, as some scholars have,
the personal culpability of Milosevic or the impact of certain cul
tural or religious institutions85 would be of questionable relevance
to the narrow legal issues presented. A canvassing of the role of the
Serbian Orthodox Church in encouraging ethnic cleansing, even if
grounded in expert testimony, would, in addition, have raised ob
jections as to unfair prejudice as well as legal relevance, irrespective
of its unquestioned historical relevance.86 The judges' flawed his
torical account simply responds to what the bench heard and what
both sides introduced into evidence under the relevant rules and
the substantive law.
Additional problems arise because of the political circumstances
faced by the tribunal. Prosecutors in the Yugoslav tribunal are very
much aware that their decisions as to whom to indict are being
closely scrutinized for evidence of bias.87 Their efforts to follow a
trial of a Serbian defendant, Tadic, with trials against Croatians and
Muslims, as well as their efforts to achieve greater balance among
the ethnicities in indictments announced to date, show the lengths
to which they will go to show the tribunal's evenhandedness and
legitimize its efforts before suspicious or incredulous audiences.88
These efforts, while understandable, are not necessarily consistent
84. See OsIEL, supra note 6; see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Life ls Not a Dramatic
Narrative, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 99 (Peter Brooks &
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAw's STORIES]; David N. Rosen, Rhetoric and Result
in the Bobby Seale Tria� in LAw's STORIES, supra, at 110.
85. Ramet states, for example, that

it is precisely in "macho" Serbia that patriarchal backlash was strongest
The entire
Milosevic phenomenon is, in fact, rooted in fear: fear of Albanians, Croats, and even,
eventually, Slovenes; fear of new political movements; fear of randomness, freedom,
chaos; and fear of women. The primordial linkage of these fears is the explanation as to
why Slobodan Milosevic 's support comes ovenvhelmingly from males - middle-aged
peasant males being the core and largest part of his support - while his opposition
draws women as well as men to its ranks and to its rallies.
RAMET, supra note 82, at 122. It is difficult to see how a comparable passage could have
appeared in the Tadic judgment - at least without drawing a severe objection complaining
of the judges' partiality or incompetence.
86. Cf. ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 89 (requiring the admission only of "relevant
evidence" with "probative value" and requiring the exclusion of any evidence whose proba
tive value "is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial").
87. Cf. Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40; Hayden, Reply, supra note 40, at 771;
Rubin, supra note 40, at 42-43.
88. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 64-66) (discussing the efforts to
achieve, and the risks of, "ethnic parity" in the context of the tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia).
. . . •
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with the production of faithful history. If it is true, as historians like
Malcolm assert,89 that the vast majority of the most serious crimes
- and certainly genocidal actions - were committed on the
Serbian side, a series of evenhanded trials among the diverse
ethnicities in the B alkan region is more likely to contribute to pre
vailing myths that all sides were equally guilty than it is to preserve
an accurate collective memory. For similar reasons, TadiC's judges
were understandably leery about rendering a historical account that
attributes blame to persons not in the dock, including Milosevic.
Quite apart from limits imposed by evidentiary or procedural rules,
it would be impolitic for the tribunal to give as frank an assessment
of the historical facts as would an academic. In the context of the
B alkans, where it is said that at least one group is waging a war
against history itself,90 the telling of accurate history is as much a
political act as is a decision to indict.
Finally, some of the tribunals' problems rendering collective
memory are attributable to the closure model's internal contradic
tions. As noted, closure demands not merely a definitive historical
account

but also a trial record that is the equal of any liberal court's.

It requires that judges render a credible history in the midst of con
ducting proceedings. that are as fully convincing as any conducted
by a national court. Judged from the perspective of this second
goal, the judges' preliminary :findings in this case are all that they
should be. Tuey provide what lawyers expect - only so much his
tory as is needed to support a plausible finding of guilt.
Tue need for closure as to the verdict implies that the defend
ant's guilt or innocence should be the focus of attention. Closure
itself demands that no one in court have the overriding goal of in
dicting or examining the broader society of which the defendant is
only a part or of truly analyzing the moral complexity of these hor
rific crimes, including an examination of competing perceptions of
victimhood. It demands that the court tell a linear story that a his89. See MALCOLM, supra note 82, at 234-52.
90. See id. at xxiv (describing the Serbian "war against the history of their country"); see
also MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED (1996) (discussing how "ethnoreligious
militants" waged a campaign of "cultural eradication" by targeting architectural, literary, and
other monuments as well as people); Chris Hedges, In Bosnia's Schools, 3 Ways Never to
Learn from History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1997, at Al (reporting on separate history, art, and
language classes now in place in schools throughout Bosnia for the various ethnicities in that
country). This facet of the Balkan conflict, is not, of course, unique to it but is a characteris
tic of many, if not all, situations involving administrative massacres. See generally IMPUNITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 73-280 (detailing case studies involving battles over
national history).
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torian might disparage.91 If Tactic's judges spent little time on the
pre-1990 history of the region, if they failed to convey in depth the
underlying motivation of the aggressors or omitted considerable de
velopments that probably contributed to the violence, they were
merely responding to the need to judge the accused and not the
former Yugoslavia.
Further, Tactic's judges can hardly be blamed if they avoided the
equivocal statements of cause and effect and subjective judgments
incapable of straightforward empirical verification that characterize
historical accounts by academics.92 Because Tactic's judges took se
riously closure's needs for the rendering of a plausible verdict, they
usually avoided subjective conclusions, confining them to those nar
row pockets expressly sanctioned by the law, such as determina
tions as to witnesses' credibility.93
B.

The Taint of Politics

As is suggested by the tribunal's problems with the presentation
of history, a second crack in the model of closure appears with re
spect to the demand that the judges remain above politics. As was
suggested above, problems begin simply because of the political
ramifications of the factual findings the judges render. When the
judges themselves disagree - as they did - with respect to
whether the JNA exercised effective control over the YRS after
May 19, 1992, it strains credulity to believe that the tribunal will
generate a settled consensus as to this attempt to render a legal
judgment about a political state of affairs.94 More significantly,
even TadiC's judges found that they could not ignore the clear
91. See generally Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra
note 84, at 84, 85 (describing similar issues for domestic courts). Of course, had Tadic's attor
neys chosen to contest the prosecution's account of the rise and goals of ethnic cleansing in
Prijedor, it is possible that the Tadic trial would have taken a different tum. Cf. Guyora
Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE
L.J. 1321 (1989) (discussing how Barbie's defense team attempted to put recent French his
tory on trial). Nonetheless, as the Barbie case itself demonstrates, even then prosecutors and
judges are likely to seek to avoid being mired in such extraneous arguments, the better to
build a convincing verdict. Further, to the extent they fail, the prospects for closure as to the
verdict seem especially remote.
92. See, e.g., supra note 85 (Ramet quote).
93. As discussed, the Tadic bench was even circumspect with respect to indicating the
extent to which it relied on witness credibility. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
94. Compare Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 603-08 with McDonald Dissent, supra note
42, 'll 6-10, 33. As the differences between the judges suggest, the lack of consensus is partly
due to the lack of clarity in the applicable legal standards. For one example of the political
implications of this finding, see Marlise Simons, Defining a War to Determine the Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1997, at E4 (suggesting that the tribunal's finding strengthened Milo�evic's
political position).
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political dimensions of the defendant's crimes. Under the relevant
law as interpreted by the judges, the defendant's actions in the
course of a general political operation such as the Serbian take-over
of Kozarac or his activities in prison camps run by the Republika
Srpska were crimes precisely

because

they were committed as part

of a broad political campaign to commit ethnic cleansing.

All of Tadic's convictions are premised on the proposition that
persecution on the grounds of political beliefs is, at least in this
case, legally and factually indistinguishable from persecution on the
grounds of race, ethnicity, or religion. The Tadic judgment, particu
larly in its reliance on the nexus between Tadic 's intent and that of
the broader society, suggests that Serbian nationalism, and by ex
tension political activity on behalf of a "Greater Serbia," depending
on the specific act committed, constitutes criminal activity and even
perhaps complicity in genocide. At the very least, the Tadic judg
ment concludes that being motivated by Serbian nationalism is a
relevant factor leading to convictions for crimes against humanity
- as both inhumane acts and persecution are - and violations of
the laws and customs of war. When the tribunal cites, in support of
its determination that Tadic was aware of the policy of discrimina
tion against non-Serbs, evidence of the defendant's reputed desire
to name his child after Slobodan Milosevic, or his political associa
tions with prominent Serbian groups, or his statements in defense
of a "Greater Serbia," is it any surprise that politically active Serbs
should regard his conviction as an attack on their political cause?
Are these determinations, however apolitically rendered, any the
less a condemnation of the political goal of creating by force an
ethnically and religiously homogeneous state?
Throughout the opinion, from its preliminary findings through
the specific factual and legal findings against Tadic, it is hard to es
cape the conclusion that the judges' target is not merely Tadic, but
Serbian nationalism, and that the judges' tacit endorsement of com
munity values in favor of an integrationist ethic is also incidentally
an endorsement of the D ayton formula for peace. Because of this,
the tribunal's solid legal case for criminal liability under interna
tional humanitarian law itself poses risks that the tribunal will con
tinue to be perceived as the political tool of those states who were
most instrumental in establis!rlng it.
Further, these political dimensions threaten the Yugoslav tribu
nal's claim that it is a truly denationalized body independent of na
tional interests and distinguishable from Nuremberg's victor's
justice. The judges' criminalization of the goals for a "Greater
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Serbia" taints governments and leaders who have engaged or are
engaging in forced expulsions to create ethnically or religiously
pure - or purer - states.95 The judgment tacitly delegitimizes
those nations that define themselves in ethnic or religious terms.96
The judges seem to be saying that such nations, if established by
force, entail criminal liability for their begetters.

But since a

number of modern nations share such origins, the tribunal's judg
ment risks revisionist critiques of ex post facto imposition of liabil
ity, hypocritical double standards, and political bias.97 The judges'
faith that their verdict will find ready acceptance among all people
of good faith appears misplaced. To the extent that those engaged
in such nationalist struggles believe themselves to be politically and
otherwise justified, there may be little shame attached to a tribunal
conviction that finds an individual guilty of such "patriotic" acts.
As this implies, a basic flaw in the model of closure as applied to
the Balkan conflict is that such cases of mass atrocities in fact arise,
as Osiel has argued, because there are few shared community senti
ments and therefore little on which tribunals can draw - at least to
elicit a shared emotional response.98 There is also the problem that
the prospects for the restoration of some shared values may de
pend, at least when the effort involves international tribunals, on a
broad consensus that if political acts are condemned as crimes be
cause they violate fundamental values, international efforts to con
vict should apply to all members of the international community.99
To the extent this is true, reliance on ad hoc tribunals, instead of a
permanent international court with worldwide jurisdiction over at
least some crimes, is incompatible with the closure model's expecta
tions and demands from the outset.100
95. See generally Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 732-33 (citing, among other
examples, Pakistan in 1946-47, the partition of Cyprus by Turkey in the aftermath of the
Ottoman Empire, and Croatia in 1941-44).
96. Cf. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity, and Community in
Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. !Nn.. L. 359, 360-68 {1996) {discussing differences between con
cepts of "state" and ethnic "nation").
97. See generally Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40; Rubin, supra note 40.
98. But see infra Part IV as to other useful functions of such prosecutions.
99. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 23, at 24-26. To this extent, bringing international prose
cutions may pose greater difficulties than national attempts.
100. For an argument that the United States' policies to encourage Haitian officials not to
prosecute criminally those involved in earlier atrocities, as well as the United Nations' efforts
to pursue immunity for peace in other places, threaten the legitimacy of current international
criminal prosecutions, see Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty
to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEXAS INTL. L.J. 1 (1996) (noting recent U.N.
attempts to encourage amnesty for peace in El Salvador, Cambodia, and South Africa as well
as in Haiti); see also SCHARF, supra note 3, at 87 (noting U.N. amnesty efforts in Somalia).

War Crime Tribunals

June 1998]
C.

2061

Unfairness to the Defendant

The third crack in the model of closure relates to its insistence
on evoking a shared consensus that defendants have been fairly
tried, in accordance with all due process.101
Despite the strenuous efforts to improve on the Nuremberg
model in these respects, the Balkan tribunal continues to labor
under Nuremberg's shadow with respect to basic principles of fair
ness, including nullum crimen sine lege. 102 There is widespread
agreement among both international and domestic lawyers the
world over that the rule against ex post facto criminal liability, codi
fied in a number of international instruments,103 seeks to provide
fair notice and protects against the "unbridled abuse of power," in
cluding the risk that selective prosecutions amount to revenge dis
guised as justice.104

The requirement that criminal liability be

based on preexisting law, at least in a democratic polity subject to
checks and balances, is also seen as providing further assurance that
criminal laws do not depart from community sentiments.1os
Although the creators of the tribunal recognized the need to ap
ply only those "rules of international humanitarian law which are
beyond any doubt part of customary law,"106 the legal decisions
rendered in the Tadic case are not likely to quell doubts that the
judges were legislating from the bench.
101. But see Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 'lI 28 (Trial Chamber, Intl.
Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, Aug. 10, 1995)
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm> [hereinafter Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion] (stating that the tribunal is "in certain respects, comparable to a mili
tary tribunal, which often has limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of
evidence").
102. See generally RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 19-22. As these authors note, this
principle comes into play in a variety of contexts, including in "constitutional prohibitions on
ex post facto laws, judicial rules of construction limiting the use of analogy in interpreting
criminal laws, doctrines prohibiting ambiguous criminal laws, and provisions in international
human rights instruments barring prosecutions for acts not criminal at the time of their com
mission." Id. at 19.
103. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (providing in relevant part: "No one shall be held guilty of any crimi
nal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.").
104. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DUKE J. CoMP. & bm.. L. 235, 290 (1993).
105. See, e.g., ANNE SA'ADAH, GERMANY'S SECOND CHANCE: TRUST, JUSTICE, AND
DEMOCRATIZATION (forthcoming Fall 1998, manuscript at 192, on file with author).
106. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 2, 'lI 34.
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Consider, for example, the tribunal's convictions for the crime
against humanity known as persecution. The Chamber's candid ad
mission that this crime has "never been clearly defined" in either
international or national law107 suggests that, despite closure's de
mands that the tribunal remain within the confines of established
and precisely defined international crimes, reliance on this crime
with a fifty-year-old pedigree may not be sufficient. Closure's de
mands do not seem satisfied by the Chamber's numerous convic
tions for something that it can only define as some form of
discrimination infringing on an individual's fundamental rights.108
Ultimately, the Chamber convicts Tadic of a crime that it can only
vaguely define.109
This is not to suggest that TadiC's judges did anything un
expected or unusual in this respect. As Cherif Bassiouni has noted,
the criticism that prosecutions for crimes against humanity violate
principles of legality because these crimes are not as precisely de
fined as some domestic criminal laws is as old as Nuremberg.110
Bassiouni attributes this endemic problem to the fact that interna
tional humanitarian law develops without "legislation" but through
"common law" developments in national and international tribu
nals, the practice of states, and the patchwork fabric of overlapping
conventions.111 While admitting that this is a weakness that needs
107. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 694.
108. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 696-97. The tribunal even suggests that no act
"separate" from the violation of the right to equality "in some serious fashion" needs to be
shown, and refuses to give any definite shape to the types of "fundamental rights" it has in
mind. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 697. To the extent that the Chamber provides exam
ples of "persecution," the wide gamut of examples it provides - from violent acts that are
already illegal under all states' laws, such as killing, to hate speech, which only some states
would find criminally liable under domestic law - and the Chamber's refusal to say anything
definitive about these examples add to the likelihood of confusion in future cases. See Tadic
Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 'll 703-10.
109. Even the tribunal's defenders recognize the vagueness of a charge for "persecution.''
See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 72-73.
110. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31 CoLUM. J. TRANsNTL. L. 457, 461-71 (1994); see also Pavel Dolenc, A
Slovenian Perspective on the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 451, 457-59 {1994) (criticizing articles 3 & 5 of the Statute of the
tribunal for, among other things, failing to define precisely its targeted offenses); Edward M.
Wise, General Rules of Criminal Law, DENV. J. lNTL. L. & POLY. 313, 315-16 (1997) (criticiz
ing international crimes as currently defined).
111. See Bassiouni, supra note 110, at 469-72; see also Theodor Meron, The Continuing
Role of Custom in the Formation ofInternational Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J, INTL. L. 238
(1996). But Christopher L. Blakesley attributes vagueness difficulties to the problem that the
international lawyers who have tried to define international crimes are insufficiently prac
ticed in the needs of the criminal law. He contends that the requirements of "actus reus" and
"mens rea" must be included in future definitions of specific international crimes and notes
that "[i]t is debatable whether customary international law or general principles derived from
the clarification of national law suffice.'' Christopher L. Blakesley, Atrocity and Its
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to be remedied, he argues that the requirements of this system "are
necessarily different from those of a codified system, and [that] th"e
same legal standards of specificity cannot be expected of it. "112
The model of closure, however, demands such specificity, espe
cially given the specificity of today's human rights entitlements for
criminal defendants.113 The lack of guidance provided by the Tadic
bench suggests why. In the wake of the Tadic case, criminal defend
ants before the Yugoslav tribunal now have no clear notice about
whether acts such as advocacy on behalf of Serbian nationalism, the
discriminatory firing of non-Serb employees, or the refusal to treat
a Muslim patient at a hospital constitute the crime of persecution
under crimes against humanity.114 Prospective defendants, of any
ethnic or religious group, have no firm guarantee that international
prosecutors, under pressure to bring evenhanded charges against all
groups in the Balkans, will not be tempted to respond to such pres
sures by inventing novel interpretations of persecution. Moreover,
the prospect that a chamber of an ad hoc international tribunal cre
ated by the Security Council may be defining new forms of interna
tional liability in the course of deciding the fate of individual
defendants. can hardly be comforting to those concerned about
keeping international lawmaking processes accountable to repre
sentative processes.
While the violent acts encompassed by TadiC's convictions for
persecution would appear to be securely within the types of actions
that all states would punish under their

domestic laws, the

Chamber's readiness to impose the stigma of a conviction for perse
cution as a crime against humanity115 raises questions about the
precise scope of this international crime and the fairness of leaving
its definition to the discretion of a court in the course of an ongoing
trial.116 This is all the more likely to become an issue given the
Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in THE LAW OF
WAR CRIMES, supra note 23, at 189, 204.
112. Bassiouni, supra note 110, at 471.
113. As Bassiouni himself concedes elsewhere, there are ever higher expectations that
international criminal law will meet the standards of national law in this regard. See
Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 241.
114. These possibilities are not farfetched if we take seriously the Tadic judgment's con
clusion that persecution requires no inhumane act other than a serious violation of the right
to equality. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
115. Cf. supra note 75 (discussing how crimes against humanity are different from "ordi
nary crimes").
116. Cf. Bassiouni, supra note 110, at 471 ("The observance of the 'rule of law' is far
more important than the ad hoc prosecution or punishment of any offender or group of
offenders.").
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probable popularity of this charge for acts that do not clearly fall
within other, less vaguely defined offenses within the tribunal's
statute.
And the Tactic Chamber's conclusions as to persecution are just
the tip of the iceberg. As critics of prosecutions for low-level per
petrators have noted, a common problem with respect to such pros
ecutions relates to uncertainties with respect to the requisite intent,
as well as defenses like self-defense, necessity, and mistake of fact
or law.117 None of these basic elements of a criminal prosecution
are defined within the tribunal's statute.118 The Tactic judgment
provides little reason for optimism that fifty years of post
Nuremb erg developments have now settled most of the uncertain
ties in the scope or interpretation of international humanitarian law
that prompted the initial criticism of those World War II trials on ex
post facto grounds. Attempts to give shape and content to the
crimes now contained in the tribunal's statute will inevitably give
rise to debates over judicial legislation and novel criminal liability,
including the liability of juveniles and the scope of the tribunal's
restitution of property remedies, as well as the interpretation of in

tent requirements for the crime of genocide.119

Other fairness issues loom large. For some continental system
lawyers, it seems inappropriate that the very judges charged with
their application and interpretation are, under the tribup.al's statute,
delegated the authority to devise their own rules of evidence and
procedure.12° Others are troubled by the provision in the tribunal's
statute permitting retrials of those previously tried in national
courts if the tribunal decides such proceedings involved convictions
or acquittals for ordinary crimes, or finds that such trials were not
impartial or independent, were designed to shield the defendant
from internatfonal liability, or were not diligently prosecutect . 121
Some common law lawyers, on the other hand, question the ability
117. See generally Suzanne Walther, Problems in Blaming and Punishing Individuals for
Human Rights Violations: The Examples of the Berlin Wall Shootings, in IMPUNITY AND
HUMAN Rlmrrs, supra note 3, at 99.
118. See Dolenc, supra note 110, at 457.
119. See generally id.; Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INTL. L. 554 {1995).
120. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 15; Dolenc, supra note 110, at 459-60.
121. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 10(2). This provision raises concerns as to its
relationship with constitutional provisions against double jeopardy, despite arguments, as
under U.S. constitutional law, that a second prosecution by the Yugoslav tribunal is analo
gous to a prosecution by a different sovereign and therefore is not constitutionally barred.
See, e.g., Dolenc, supra note 110, at 460-61.
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of the prosecutor to request appellate review of a judgment.122
Troubling open-ended issues remain concerning the scope of reme
dies for the accused, including whether individuals will have a right
to seek compensation from the tribunal for unlawful arrest, impris
onment, or perhaps harm to their reputations as a result of a public
indictment.123 Objections concerning unequal treatment from
those ultimately convicted by the tribunal but sent to serve time in
prisons in different states are also likely to emerge.124
_
TadiC's trial also raises issues under the tribunal's evidentiary
rules. Among the most discussed has been the evidentiary ruling by
the Tadic chamber to permit the use of anonymous witnesses. That
ruling, premised on article 22 of the tribunal's statute,125 was issued
over the stinging partial dissent of the Australian judge, who feared
that this would violate TadiC's rights under a different provision of
the tribunal's Statute "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him."126 The trial chamber's majority decision has since
prompted considerable criticism, particularly among common law
attorneys, and led a former Legal Advisor of the U.S. State
Department, who had been prominently involved in the tribunal's
creation, to lead a charge within the American Bar Association and
elsewhere to reverse this decision or to seek amendment of the
U.N. Charter by attaching a "Bill of Rights."127 Others have ques
tioned even the more moderate provisions within the tribunal's
rules permitting in camera proceedings or other measures to pro122. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An American Jurisprudential
Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribuna� 30 N.Y.U. J. INTI..
L. & PoL. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author).
123. On the tribunal's right to conduct public indictments, see ICTY Rules, supra note 33,
rule 61(B)-(C).
124. For now it appears that the rules within the distinct national systems will govern
issues involving the enforcement of sentences, including early release, rights to visitation, and
type of confinement. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 27. For a discussion of other uncer
tainties with respect to the Yugoslav Tribunal's approach to sentencing, see Cors & Fisher,
supra note 44; Yee, supra note 81.
125. Article 22 provides: "The International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of proce
dure and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the pro
tection of the victim's identity." ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 22; see also ICTY Rules,
supra note 33, Rules 70, 75.
126. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion, supra note 101 (separate opinion of Stephen,
J.) (relying on article 21(4)(e) of the tribunal's statute). In the end, two anonymous wit
nesses, L and H, were permitted to testify against Tadic and one of these witnesses' testimony
(L's) was later withdrawn.
127. See Leigh, supra note 81, at 238. But see Christine Chinkin, Arnicus Curiae Brief on
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Submitted by Dean and Professor of Law
Christine Chinkin, in 7 CRIM. L.F. 179 (1996).
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tect victims' and witnesses' identities, as well as the tribunal's ap
parent willingness to admit hearsay.12s
Other fairness issues emerge because of circumstances within
the Balkans. In the Tadic case, the vast bulk of the evidence to
convict came not in the form of irrebuttable physical evidence of
atrocities - including contemporaneous and meticulously docu
mented written records of atrocities, as at Nuremberg129 - but
through the oral testimony of self-interested live eyewitnesses - in
all cases, Serbian witnesses for the defense and non-Serbs - mostly
Muslim victims - for the prosecution.13o For the judges, this situa
tion posed considerable difficulties. How does a tribunal generate
confidence in its conclusions regarding a body of conflicting testi
mony in the face of the charge that Muslim witnesses will say any
thing against those who they believe are at war with them and that
Serbian witnesses will do the same against non-Serbs? How does
the tribunal's treatment of the inevitable conflict between the bi
ases of Serb and non-Serb witnesses avoid replicating amongst trial
observers in the region the prevalent ethnic and religious strains
that gave rise to the conflict in the first place?131 How does a court
generate credibility about its findings as to credibility?
As noted, the Tadic bench reached for the kind of solution fa
miliar to any court in a liberal state - it dismissed the relevance of
witnesses' ethnic or religious affiliations and deftly avoided nearly
all reference to such affiliations when stating its reasons for deter128. See, e.g., Dalene, supra note 110, at 463 (noting article 22 of the Statute and rules 75
and 79); Prosecuting and Defending Violations of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The In·
temational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 ASIL PROC. 239, 247-51 (1994) [hereinaf·
ter Prosecuting and Defending Violations] (remarks of Steven J. Lepper) (discussing the
development of the Balkan tribunal's rules). For a survey of the lacunae in the tribunals'
rules, see, for example, Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507 (1994); Prosecuting and
Defending Violations, supra, at 243-45 (remarks of Christopher L. Blakesley); Scharf, supra
note 122 (manuscript at 11-22). As Ratner and Abrams indicate, international lawyers have
attempted to fill these lacunae through resort to evidentiary rules used in international com·
mercial tribunals, including arbitrations, with mixed results. See RA1NER & ABRAMS, supra
note 3, at 216-17. There are obvious uncertainties for defendants and their attorneys posed
by the wide-open license given to the tribunal to apply "rules of evidence which will best
favour a fair determination of the matter" and "are consonant \vith the spirit of the Statute
and the general principles of law." ICTY Rules, supra note 33, § 3, rule 89. Defense attor
neys are likely to argue that fairness dictates that they have notice, in advance of trial,
whether, for example, co=on law rules of privilege apply.
129. At Nuremberg, the prosecution submitted some seven million pages of meticulously
kept Nazi documents. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 117.
130. See id. at 212.
131. For a su=ary of the difficulties such oral testimony produced, see id. at 111-205,
212-13. See also id. at 64 (discussing the credibility problems presented by both the absence
of a Muslim member of the bench and the fact that four of the eleven judges of the tribunal
came from predominately Muslim countries).
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mining credibility.132 Yet, in this context, arguments that such affili
ations matter make a great deal of sense. Ordinary trials, even

those at Nuremberg, are not conducted in the midst of ongoing hos
tilities between the parties where witnesses, after .giving their testi
mony, return to separate enclaves to continue their verbal - and

sometimes physical - combat.133 In such contexts a Serb or
Muslim witness, only temporarily in The Hague, faces enormous
pressure to give

testimony favorable

to

his or

her

side.134

Although, as indicated, the tribunal attempted to avoid any accusa
tions that any witness, Serb or non-Serb, was lying,135 in most cases
it found credible the testimony of victims in the face of an incom

plete alibi testimony by defense witnesses, including Tadic's wife.

Regardless of what the judges chose to acknowledge, they decided
that certain defense testimony, as by those who adamantly testified
that Tadic could not have been physically present in Kozarac or in

certain camps, was not credible because it was self-serving.136 But
they refused, in most cases, to accept comparable defense claims

with respect to the testimony of Muslims.137

Quite apart from significant questions about whether parties in

such situations truly enjoy equality of arms, the Tadic bench's credi-

132. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
133. See generally Michael J. Keegan, The Preparation of Cases for the ICTY, 7
TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 120 (1997).
134. This fact also raises a problem that the tribunal only briefly addresses: the lack of
equal access to evidence given the locations of defense and prosecution witnesses. The tribu
nal notes the number of steps taken to alleviate the "inherent difficulties" of this "difficulty
encountered by both parties," including video-conferencing links and the grant of safe con
duct to testify at The Hague. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 530-31. Of course, defense
lawyers would argue that lack of equal access to evidence should not be presented as a prob
lem of equal weight to both sides: lack of access to Muslim-held areas may crucially disad
vantage a defendant who is unable to rebut prosecution testimony. Further, the prosecution
has available tools, such as the possibility of U.N. sanctions, that the defense does not have.
For a discussion of these and other disadvantages suffered by defense counsel before the
Balkan tribunal, see Mark S. Ellis, Comment, Achieving Justice Before the International War
Crimes Tribunal: Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. CoMP. & INTL. L. 519
(1997). See also Keegan, supra note 133 (discussing similar issues from the prosecutor's
perspective).
135. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
136. The testimony of at least some of those witnesses was on some issues so unequivocal
that it appears that the tribunal found them sub silentio not credible. For example, the
judges apparently simply chose not to believe one defense witness who testified that the
Serbian-run checkpoints in which Tadic served were established not to confirm ethnic iden
tity but merely to check for stolen cars. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 184.
137. Indeed, it was unusual when the judges chose to disregard the testimony of any
Muslim witness in this case
as they did some of the testimony of witness Hakija Elezovic.
See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'J[ 296 (citing the witness's "confused" state). Far more
commonly, the judges disregarded "minor" discrepancies in oral testimony and gave
credence to victims' testimony. See, eg., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 275 (finding the
testimony of Hase Icic credible).
-
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bility determinations, grounded in subjective factors such as de
meanor, routine in ordinary trials, assume problematic proportions.
Given ongoing hostilities on the ground and the suspicion among at
least some that the tribunal serves the interests of only some ethnic
groups,138 the judges have little reservoir of good will upon which to
draw.. Closure as to their factual conclusions would seem to require
a great deal more smoking-gun physical evidence than was
presented at trial.
In these respects, the Tadic trial raises significant doubts about
the prospects for generating settled consensus with respect to the
treatment of defendants. These concerns also raise doubts about
whether such trials truly will provide the international community
the opportunity to endorse in solidarity liberal values or the rule of
law.
D.

Unfairness to Victims

Closure demands that victims be mollified and, if possible, com
pensated - at least through the return of lost property. At a mini
mum, the international criminal process is supposed to afford
opportunities for victims to tell their stories, to find psychological
comfort through their participation at trial, to rehabilitate their rep
utations, and to draw comfort from the defendant's shame, punish
ment, and acts of contrition.139
TadiC's trial satisfied few of these goals. His victims were not
compensated for lost property, for injuries suffered, or for emo
tional distress caused. Nor were they able to tell their full stories at
trial, during sentencing, or in the bench's record of their testimony.
Despite the parade of Muslim victims at trial, their testimony was
circumscribed by the needs of this litigation and by the formal rules
of the relevant criminal law. Prosecution witnesses were en
couraged only to present "fragmented narratives"140 - to identify
whether they actually saw Tadic engaged in the acts charged and,
briefly, to describe what happened to them at a specific date and
138. See, e.g., Cotic, supra note 78; Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal,
FOREIGN PoLY., Fall 1996, at 72.
139. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 19-21 (identifying the elements of a "victim
centered approach" as involving "public recognition" of the wrongs done to victims and,
where possible, compensation); see also ICTY Statute supra note 2, at 2 (authorizing restitu
tion as a possible remedy).
140. Cf. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra note
84, at 2, 8.
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time relevant to the precise charges.141 Though often identified by
name in the judgment, victims became essentially faceless place
holders for dates, times, and acts connected to specific counts in the
indictment. Beyond giving brief identifications, they were not en
couraged to tell their life stories, to indicate their political views, or
to unburden themselves and give voice to fears or hopes. Witnesses
were not asked to describe in detail the psychological or physical
anguish they suffered after being detained at the various detention
camps. Muslim victims were not encouraged to tell the judges the
emotional scars incurred as a result of being treated as subhuman
by their tormentors or whether this treatment, along with the per
vasive ethnic and religious slurs they endured, had an impact on
their perceptions of self-worth, their relationship with family mem
bers, or their views of Serbs generally. Family members of the Mus
lim policemen who were killed were not asked to testify what the
absence of these men had meant to them. Victims were not en
couraged to put a price on their injuries.142
On the contrary, the encouragement of emotional testimony by
victims, however presented, would probably have been seen as "un
fairly prejudicial," "insufficiently probative," or even "irrelevant"
by the tribunal's judges, at least during trial.143 Here, as elsewhere,
the closure model's demands point in contradictory directions: it
seeks to provide closure for victims while requiring that judges up
hold the "dignity and decorum of the proceedings."144 The latter
seeks to elicit societal consensus on the premise that tribunal deci
sions are based on the application of rules of law, not raw
emotion.145
141. For a summary of eyewitnesses' testimonies at trial, see SCHARF, supra note 3, at
139-73.
142. See Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 42) (approving of the fact that proceed
ings before the Yugoslav tribunal focus on the perpetrator, not the victim). For arguments
that the tensions between the needs of victims and the traditional needs of the criminal law
may be endemic, see, for example, Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative
Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 135.
143. Cf. ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 89 (weighing probative value of evidence against
its prejudicial effect). At Tadic's pre-sentencing hearing, the prosecutor did present, how
ever, "victim input statements." See Sentencing Judgment, supra note 76, at para. 4. Still, the
Tadic judges refused to consider the amount of victims' alleged economic loss for purposes of
sentencing. Id.
144. See, e.g., ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 80.
145. See Anthony Kronman, Leontius' Tale, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 54, 56
(arguing that, to the extent such rules suppress emotional stories that ought to be told, the
judicial account can be rendered less persuasive). But see Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming
Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 61, 82 (argu
ing that imposition of constraints is "designed to vindicate the co=unal majesty of the
law"). As these conflicting arguments imply, the tribunal's rules concerning decorum sug
gest, in microcosm, inherent tensions within the model of closure.
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Under the circumstances, it seems doubtful that Tactic's victims,
whether or not they testified, were really able to assert "their sense
of control and autonomy," enhance their dignity, "lessen their isola
tion . . . increase their feeling of belonging to a community, [and]
. . . find some meaning in their victimization."146 While some of
TadiC's victims may indeed have experienced some catharsis in
pointing a finger at their torturer at trial and may have derived
some satisfaction from TadiC's conviction and penalty, some may
have found a penalty of effectively ten years in prison equivalent to
a slap on the wrist given the brutality they endured at his hands.
Certainly no victim received, as the closure model would imply, any
acknowledgment of shame or any other act of expiation from Tactic
or any of the Serbian officials that he served .141
Least mollified at the end of the Tactic trial was, presumably,
witness F, the unnamed female prisoner whose charges of rape
against Tactic were ultimately withdrawn because of her refusal to
be a witness at trial. As part of its evidentiary decision regarding
anonymous witnesses, the trial chamber had decided to delay dis
closure of witness F's identity to the defense until shortly before
trial, to withhold her identity from the public and the media, and to
withhold her and her family's address and present whereabouts
from both defense and public.148 While the trial chamber's decision
was not reversed,149 wj.tness F nonetheless declined to testify.150 Ir
respective of the trial chamber's evidentiary edict, the rape accusa
tions were never aired.

Indeed, continued opposition to the

prospect of secret witnesses is likely to put pressure on prosecutors
in future cases to insist that most if not all witnesses be identified
regardless of the trial chamber's evidentiary decision in this case.
The dismissal of the rape charge in the Tactic case raises more
general concerns that the tribunal may not be able to cope with the
needs of the many women in the Balkan region who were victims of
systematic rapes;- including those Bosnian women who, it is alleged,
were systematically raped while in detention in order to be impreg146. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 19.
147. For a discussion of how some forms of expiation or apology can be adapted to theo
ries of "reintegrative shaming," see Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes:
Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 7, 40 (1995).
148. See Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion, supra note 101, 'JI 53, 90; see also Chinkin,
supra note 127, at 186 n.2.
149. Indeed, as a procedural decision, it was not subject to interlocutory appeal under the
tribunal's rules. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 25; ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 73.
150. See Chinkin, supra note 127, at 186 n.2.
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nated with chetnik children as part of a policy of ethnic cleansing.151
Some victim groups have charged that the procedures and modest
witness protection capabilities of both the ICTR and the ICTY are
inadequate to the enormous task of prosecuting such claims.152 The
dismissal of the rape charge in the Tadic case is likely to prompt
fears of similar dismissals in other cases, along with complaints that
victims of gender-specific crimes will never be heard, especially if
the defendant can be prosecuted on other charges.153
More generally, worries exist that, despite the tribunal's recog
nition that rape is indeed a cognizable crime under international
humanitarian law, its bench and prosecutors remain constrained by
the U.N.'s154 and international law's155 gendered nature. There is
concern that the gender-specific tactics deployed in the Balkan con
flict, including the alleged use of rape as a tool of genocide directed
specifically at women

because they are women, will go unrecognized

not merely in the Tadic case where rape charges were deemed irrel
evant, but in future prosecutions - to the detriment of the needs
and rights of victims, the credibility of the tribunal, and the preser
vation of collective memory.156 For these reasons, at least absent
amendments to the tribunal's definition of covered offenses to give
explicit recognition to the many forms of gender-specific violence, it
is possible that the record of the tribunal's prosecutions will, in the
end, be as unjust to the memory of women victimized by the Balkan
conflict as Nuremberg arguably was with respect to the victims of
the Holocaust.157
151. See Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (May
24, 1997) (transmitting Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
S.C. Res. 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at IV(F)(3), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report]).
152. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHELTERED LIVES 9-10 (1996) (outlining specific steps
needed to reform prosecutions and investigations before the !CTR to enable it to pursue
permutations of gender-specific violence); id. at 24-26 (noting specific ways that the ICTR's
methods and procedures fall short).
153. See generally Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International
Law, 5 EuR. J. !Nn.. L. 326 (1994). For one set of recommendations intended to respond to
the needs of victims of gender-specific violence, see Mission of the Women in the Law Pro
ject, No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 91 (1994).
154. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist
Futures for the United Nations, 4 TRANSNATL. L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 421 (1994).
155. See generally Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law,
85 AM. J. INTL. L. 613 (1991).
156. See generally Simon Chesterman, Never Again . . . and Again: Law, Order, and the
Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALE J. INTL. L. 299, 324-42 (1997).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. For a survey of the many ways interna
tional humanitarian law, as recorded in the tribunal's statutory jurisdiction, fails to take suffi
cient account of the Balkan's "gender-based" terrorism, see Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It:
·
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Despite the best intentions of Tactic's judges, their judgment
perpetuates the inadequacies of international humanitarian law
with respect to the treatment of women. The judges' preliminary
findings and their account of the Serbian policies in which Tactic
joined focus only on issues of ethnicity, race, religion, or politics,
but not gender. The judges invite revulsion against particular kinds
of offenses committed against fundamental human dignity while ig
noring other indignities that were equally a part of the Balkan land
scape. The stories of how mass rape and its threat have been used
in the Balkans158 - as a tool of expulsion; of how forced impregna
tion became a weapon of genocide and territorial and emotional
conquest; of how sexual invasion has been employed as a device to
undermine the honor of both victim and her family and as symbolic
castration of her spouse159 - were not addressed in the tribunal's
account of the rise of

"ethnic

conflict" in the region and it may

never be part of the Yugoslav tribunal's accounts of relevant his
tory.1 60 Guided by the gender-neutral definitions of relevant
crimes, which fail to recognize explicitly these acts as cognizable

crimes,161 the narrow confines of the specific charges against Tactic
and the dismissal of the sole charge of rape, the Tactic bench sup-

Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human
Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 793 (1997). For an enumeration
of proposed changes to the definitions of international crimes that would encompass changes
to the definition of "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention, the laws or customs of war,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, see KELLY DAWN AsKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST
WoMEN 380-403 (1997). See also Chinkin, supra note 153; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes
of War, Crimes ofPeace, 4 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 59 (1993).
158. See Final Report, supra note 151, at 55-60.
159. See generally M. CHERIF BAss10um & MARCIA McCORMICK, SEXUAL VIOLENCE:
AN INvismLE WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Intl. Hum. Rts. L. Inst.
Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). In fact, allegations of genocidal rape go back at least to
Soviet actions in World War II. See, e.g., Colloquy, Comparative Analysis of International
and National Tribunals, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 545, 629 (comments of Professor Istvan
Deak). For a historical survey of war crimes against women and humanitarian law's equivo
cal attempts to confront these prior to the creation of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals,
see AsKIN, supra note 157, at 1-203, 243-60.
160. Cf. RAMET, supra note 82, at 117-29 (discussing the role of "gender culture" in the
Balkans); Ray, supra note 157, at 801-21 (describing the many ways women have been terror
ized in the former Yugoslavia). For consideration of what "neutral" terms like "ethnic con
flict" conceal, see generally MacKinnon, supra note 157.
161. Ray argues that the gender-neutral definitions of "grave breaches," the "laws and
customs of war," "persecution," or "crimes against humanity" generally, fail to give a name
to gendered forms of victimization, including explicit recognition for the crimes of forced
prostitution, pregnancy, and maternity under both "grave breaches" and "crimes against hu
manity." She also argues that "persecution" ought to extend to persecution on the basis of
gender. Ray, supra note 157, at 826. From the perspective of the Tadic judgment, Ray's
proposals would also imply that the judges should reconsider their insistence that "grave
breaches" require interstate conflict. See generally id. at 830-35 (critiquing the "public/pri
vate dichotomy" as applied to recent events in the Balkans).
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pressed the stories of many victims in its preliminary findings. It
rendered gender-specific violence and its many forms of victimiza
tion nearly invisible.162
Absent modification of the tribunal's statute to include the
crimes - and recognize the harms - identified by its feminist crit
ics, it seems quite likely that prosecutorial arguments that particular
defendants were driven by the express intent to, for example, de
mean women as women or demean men because of the treatment
of their wives and daughters, will not be made. After all, none of
the crimes within the tribunal's jurisdiction, including persecution,
require a specific showing of intent to force pregnancy or to castrate
men symbolically through the rape of their spouses. Yet if no one
asks about these injuries and indignities, victims of gender-specific
violence will be revictimized to the extent that their crimes go
unnamed.
On the other hand, meeting these and other demands of the clo
sure model on behalf of victims and for the sake of collective mem
ory could conflict with the model's competing requisite: fair notice
to defendants and avoidance of ex post facto criminal liability.163
Proposals to modify existing definitions of war crimes explicitly to
recognize gender-specific violence run into probable objections that
such legal innovations, especially if undertaken by a tribunal in the
course of pending trials, would replicate one of Nuremberg's princi

pal fl.aws. 164 Whether or not this is the case, the tensions between
the retributive demands of victims and demands for due process for
defendants is likely to lead to protracted debates, not closure.

162. For a suggestion that comparable failures may turn the tribunal into an "agent of
persecution," see Chinkin, supra note 127, at 182 (citing AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM CoMMN.
REP. No. 69, PART I, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAw: JusnCE FoR WoMEN 250 (1994)) (dis
cussing what may happen should the tribunal fail to protect victims' identities).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
164. Cf. supra note 32 and accompanying text. Even without going to the lengths de
manded by critics like Ray and Askin, the tribunal is still likely to run into criticism that it is
making new law and imposing ex post facto criminal liability, as is suggested by the prior
discussion on persecution. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. Moreover, should
it pursue, as expected, prosecutions for mass rape, the tribunal will face a number of novel
questions, including the liability of nongovernmental paramilitary units and the classification
of mass rape. Should mass rape be considered as a crime against humanity, grave breach of
the Geneva Conventions, violation of the laws and customs of war, or genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, an attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide?
As noted, trials for human rights violations often invite litigation of such issues over retro
active legislation. See, e.g., SA ADAH, supra note 105 (manuscript at 190-91); Walther, supra
note 117.
'
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Lessons from Rwanda

The problems enumerated above are not unique to the Tadic
case nor to the Yugoslav tribunal. Although the Rwanda tribunal,
whose jurisdiction extends to a somewhat different set of interna
tional crimes, faces differing political conditions on the ground and
within the U.N., it faces comparable challenges. That international
tribunal faces possibly greater obstacles in balancing the rights of
criminal defendants - mostly Hutu - with the rights and expecta
tions of victims - mostly Tutsi. It seems clear that most of the
nearly

90,000

detainees in Rwanda now awaiting trial will not re

ceive the full-scale speedy trial to which each is entitled under inter
national human rights standards before either Rwandan courts or
the international tribunal.165 On the other hand, even if hundreds
are ultimately convicted before the international tribunal in
Arusha, there are strong indications that many victims will not be
mollified by a process that, over the opposition of the present Tutsi
government in Rwanda, will refuse to apply the death penalty.1 66
There is an understandable thirst for revenge within Rwanda.167
Many there see the recent horrific slaughters in their country - in
which anywhere from

500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed - as

even more ignominious than the ethnic cleansing of the Balkans, at
least in the number of victims and arguably in the clearer genocidal
intent evidenced by the culprits.168 The sheer scale of the Hutu kill165. What is worse, as Blakesley points out, those detained in Rwanda's prisons are there
solely because of denunciations by persons who could have been motivated by any number of
personal grudges and there are estimates that anywhere from 20 to 40% percent of those now
jailed may be innocent. See Blakesley, supra note 111, at 198.
166. For a description of the response of the U.N. and human rights advocates to
Rwanda's demands for application of the death penalty, see Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3,
at 510-11.
167. There are ongoing reports of "hundreds, perhaps thousands" of Tutsi revenge kill
ings amidst periodic waves of civil strife and a "government in exile" periodically threatening
to seize power, again in part to grant "amnesty" for Hutus and charge Tutsis with genocide.
See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 111, at 197.
168. Alain Destexhe, the Secretary-General of Medecins Sans Frontieres, argues that the
Hutu killings, motivated by the attempt to destroy Tutsis as a group and not merely by the
desire to seize territory or possessions, compose one of only three real genocides of the twen·
tieth century. See ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CEN·
TURY 20 (Alison Marschner trans., 1995). He contends that the incomparable stigma of the
term "genocide" ought to be confined, consistent with international law and Nuremberg's
legacy, to killings seeking the destruction of ethnic, national, or religious groups as such be
cause "[k]illing someone simply because he or she exists . . . is a crime against the very
essence of what it is to be human." Id. at 4. He argues that politically motivated murders or
those motivated by forcing a particular group from certain territory, such as Serbian killings
of Muslims, that fall short of seeking the total elimination of the targeted group should not be
considered "genocide." See id. at 18-19. Of course, since the creators of Yugoslav tribunal
specifically included "genocide" within that tribunal's jurisdictional mandate, they took a
broader view of that crime.
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ings - as well as some of the Tutsi reprisals - only increases the
challenge for those trying to channel the quest for revenge into the
peaceful confines of a courtroom.
As with the Yugoslav tribunal, proceedings in Arusha are draw
ing objections from those who see political motivations behind that
tribunal's establishment and ongoing prosecutorial and judicial de
cisions. While the Rwanda international prosecutions will draw
fewer complaints from human rights advocates than will domestic
prosecutions in Rwanda that are far more likely to be tainted by
charges of bias and victor's justice, the Rwanda tribunal's jurisdic
tion is not free from controversy. That body's jurisdiction extends
to the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and a larger
number of crimes against the laws of war than are included in the
Yugoslav tribunal's statute.169 But it is limited to acts committed
during calendar year 1994, a compromise between the desires of the
current Tutsi government in Rwanda, which was instrumental in the
tribunal's creation - though it ultimately voted against its estab
lishment - and members of the U.N.170 Though the Rwanda tribu
nal's temporal and subject-matter jurisdictional limitations permit
trials against some Tutsis who are known to have committed iesser
crimes in the second half of 1994, they do not reach all crimes by all
sides as closure demands. Further, the limitations on the tribunal's
jurisdictional reach and the resources available to it171 dim the pros
pects that its proceedings will preserve an accurate or definitive ac
count of the Rwanda genocide and its aftermath. On the contrary,
the tribunal's reliance on the continued cooperation of the current
Rwanda government is likely to compromise its ability to present a
complete rendering of the Tutsis' role in acts of violence.
International proceedings in Arusha, no less than those in The
Hague, are also likely to draw complaints from defense attorneys

169. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 2, at 2 with !CTR Statute, supra note 2, at 3-5.
170. See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case ofRwanda,
7 DuKE J. CoMP. & INn.. L. 349, 353-57 (1997). The Rwanda government would have llin
ited the tribunal's jurisdiction solely to genocide. It would also have funited its jurisdiction to
cover only the period from October 1, 1990, when they considered the foundations of the
genocide to have been laid by the then-Hutu government, to July 17, 1994, by which time the
present Tutsi government had taken control. Effectively this would have meant that the in
ternational tribunal would try only Hutus. For a description of the temporal and subject
matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda 'tribunal, discussing the relevant compromises and drawing
comparisons with the Yugoslav tribunal, see Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, at 506-10.
171. The ICTR's financial difficulties have been the subject of considerable media atten
tion. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, In East Africa, Panel Tackles War Crimes, and Its Own
Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, § 1, at AS.
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and scholars about lack of fairness for defendants.112 For the
Rwanda tribunal, the charge of ex post facto liability is likely to
prove particularly troublesome. In creating the Rwanda tribunal,
the Security Council departed from its prior attempt - in the
course of creating the Yugoslav tribunal - to include only well
established international crimes. It extended the Rwanda tribunal's
jurisdiction to violations of Common Article Three of the Geneva
Conventions173 and Article Four of Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions.174 Many do not believe that the latter consti
tutes established customary international law, and this effort marks
the first time Common Article Three has been read as a basis for
criminal responsibility.175 Even if it is assumed that culprits in
Rwanda were under fair notice that their violent acts would subject
them to criminal liability - at least under national law - the scar
city of applicable precedents under international humanitarian law
means that the Rwanda tribunal's judges, when they lay out the
requisites of proof with respect to the wide variety of acts now cov
ered, will be developing and not merely applying the law. As noted
with respect to the Tactic judgment, this prospect will surely lead to
challenges on the basis of violation of the principle of

men sine lege.176

nullem cri

Nor is it yet clear how this tribunal will manage

the treacherous problems of defining defenses such as mistake of
fact or superior orders in a way that does not, for example, view the
anti-Tutsi radio broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines as giving such
defenses an air of reality.111
172. For discussions of the problematic areas, including diverse interpretations of the
standard of proof, the presumption of innocence, the right to legal counsel, non-bis-in-idem/
double jeopardy, the interpretation of evidentiary rules, and uncertainties with respect to
enforcement of sentences and incarceration, see, for example, Blakesley, supra note 111, at
209-18; Rod Dixon, Developing International Rules ofEvidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda
Tribunals, 7 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 81 (1997).
173. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 4.
174. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 4.
175. See Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, at 510. For a defense of the Rwanda tribunal's
statute on this point, see Meron, supra note 119, at 565-68.
176. Cf. supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (on persecution); supra note 111 (dis
cussing Blakesley's views on inadequacies of international criminal law). Article 4 of the
Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal includes as cognizable crimes violence to life, health, or phys
ical or mental well-being of persons, and, in particular, murder; cruel treatment; collective
punishment; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages against personal dignity; rape and
enforced prostitution; pillage; the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execution
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court; and threats to com
mit any of the foregoing acts. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 4. For one response to the
ex post facto challenge, see Meron, supra note 119, at 567 (arguing that "[m]urder is murder
all over the world").
177. See The Queen v. Fmta, (1994) 1 S.C.R. 701, 848 (Can.).
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It also remains unlikely that the Rwanda tribunal will be able to

go much farther than the Yugoslav tribunal in assisting victims. The
financial and personnel problems with respect to the Rwanda tribu
nal, which to date have proven even more difficult than with its
Balkan cousin,178 dim the prospects for such amenities as psycho
logical counseling and effective witness protection. Further,
although the Rwanda tribunal's specific recognition of some
gender-specific crimes, such as enforced prostitution, has won ap
plause from victims' groups in comparison with the Yugoslav tribu
nal, the tribunal's listing of cognizable crimes still falls short of
according full recognition to the many faces of gender-specific
victimization.179
F.

Getting Past Nuremberg

On the basis of the preceding discussion, it would be tempting to
conclude that both ad hoc tribunals have failed to correct Nurem
berg's flaws, and that their ongoing trials - like those at the end of
World War II and many national trials for human rights violations
since - fail to resolve inherent contradictions between the founda
tional, political, and epic goals of their creators.180 It is tempting to
conclude that the model of closure fails simply because it demands
that judges, from Nuremberg to Arusha, reconcile the irreconcila
ble: that is, because it demands that they must render a definitive
history but convict only identifiable perpetrators; provide an edify
ing public spectacle to buttress the national and international rule
of law while providing defendants scrupulously fair trials; and ac
complish all of these while mollifying victims.181
Moreover, it appears that neither the Rwanda nor Yugoslav tri
bunal has managed to mediate successfully the political divides be
tween east and west, north and south any better than the
Nuremberg or the Tokyo tribunals did. Charges of double stan
dards, American exceptionalism, victor's justice, or judicial neo
colonialism have been deflected but not altogether avoided in each
178. For a survey of some of the financial dilemmas which these tribunals have posed
within the U.N., see, for example, ScHARF, supra note 3, at 44-49, 79-84; Shraga & Zacklin,
supra note 3, at 512; Myers, supra note 171, § 1, at 6. Indeed, the Tadic trial itself, initially
"scheduled to begin in November 1995, was postponed until May 7, 1996, for want of $78,000
for expenses for defense counsel and investigators." See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 83.
179. Cf. supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. "Forced pregnancy" was given ex
plicit recognition only in later drafts of the Rwanda tribunal's statute. See Blakesley, supra
note 111, at 211.
180. See generally LUBAN, supra.note 21, at 335-78, 379-91 (discussing the "foundational,"
"political" and "epic" aspects of Nuremberg and other trials).
181. See generally id.; OsIEL, supra note 6, passim; Simpson, supra note 23, at 20.
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case.182 Despite the attempt to create denationalized entities, these
tribunals remain tainted by the national interests that dominate the
organ that created them: the Security Council. Some countries,
both on and off the Security Council, have expressed qualms about
the expansive reinterpretations of the Security Council's powers
that permitted establishment of these ad hoc bodies.183 The Secur
ity Council's assumptions of power are not merely perceived by
some as a threat to sovereignty.184 Some U.N. members and schol
ars have lingering concerns about the actual judicial independence
these tribunals enjoy.185 The Yugoslav tribunal, the first to be con
fronted squarely with some of these issues in the course of the Tadic
case, has given nearly as many answers as there are nationalities
182. See LESCURE & TRINTIGNAc, supra note 18, at 96; Cotic, supra note 78, at 233-35;
Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 742; Thornberry, supra note 138. See also
ALFR.Eo P. RuBIN, ETHics AND AUTHORITY IN lNrERNATIONAL LAW 170-206 (1997). As
one co=entator has noted, the Tadic trial had an "unmistakable 'American flavor"' since
its presiding judge was from the United States, along with three out of four persons on the
prosecution team. See Scharf, supra note 122 (manuscript at 8). Further, since the United
States has provided 22 lawyers and investigators to the Yugoslav tribunal, far more than any
other Security Council member state, this may be true of other trials at The Hague as well.
Id. at 8, n. 23.
183. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, China Refuses to Go Along With Creation of Pol Pot
Tribuna� N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at A6 (reporting on China's objections to a proposed ad
hoc tribunal for Cambodia). After all, the Security Council's decisions in these instances are
unprecedented: it has determined the precise scope of individual criminal liability; codified
- and probably progressively developed - international criminal law by giving Council
sanction to two lists of cognizable international crimes contained in the tribunals' respective
statutes; boosted the prospects for a permanent international criminal court; and lent its con
siderable enforcement powers to all these efforts at the expense of national courts and the
hitherto exclusive rights of each state to determine for itself whether to cooperate with an
other's criminal investigation or whether to extradite a criminal suspect upon request. For
examples of the resulting qualms among some member states, see Report of the Special Com
mittee on the Charter ofthe United Nations and on the Strengthening ofthe Role ofthe Organi
zation, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 33, U.N. Doc. A/49/33 (1994).
184. See, e.g., Dolenc, supra note 110.
185. Since independent criminal courts created by U.N. executive action are unprece
dented, no one knows whether the Security Council retains residual authority over these
tribunals to amend either tribunal's statute or to terminate either tribunal before its cases are
concluded based, for example, on a determination that a threat to the international peace no
longer exists. No one knows whether the Council can direct either tribunal not to indict or
not to prosecute particular high government officials whose prosecution might be detrimental
to the maintenance of the international peace. No one knows whether either tribunal is
legally entitled - or willing - to tell the Council that such attempts to interfere are null and
void - or what would happen if either tribunal tried. Thus far, only hints of answers to
many such fundamental questions about the relative independence and powers of these
tribunals have come in earlier trial and appellate chamber decisions in response to jurisdic
tional challenges brought by TadiC's attorneys. See Decision on Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction, supra note 19; Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note
19; see also Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic [sic] Case, 7 EuR. J. INTL. L.
245, 249-60 (1996); Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent
ofNuremberg Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237, 244-46 (1994); Geoffrey R. Watson, The Humani
tarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Tadic [sic],
36 vA. J. INTL. L. 687 (1996).
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represented .on its bench. Judicial unanimity has been understanda
bly elusive given the novelties of that tribunal's creation and the
wide gaps in international criminal practice.
Yet the specter of Nuremberg misleads. Merely correcting
Nuremberg's flaws would not necessarily lead to closure. The Yu
goslav and Rwanda tribunals face many issues reminiscent of those
faced by earlier war crimes prosecutions. But their greatest chal
lenges

are

unique:

both

tribunals

are

expected

to

fashion

Nuremberg-styled justice in the absence of D-Day. Each of today's
ad hoc tribunals faces challenges unknown to those who organized
and conducted World War !I's trials.
The Yugoslav tribunal has issued approximately seventy-five in
dictments but has only a handful of people in custody - none of
whom is a key member of the relevant political or military leader
ship. Absent further arrests by NATO forces or other forceful ac
tion by the Council on recalcitrant governments in the region, the
Yugoslav tribunal's list of indictments is likely to continue to be
distinguished by the lack of high profile defendants. The selective
prosecutions of small fry like Tadic are likely to draw complaints
that the process mocks justice.186 While the Rwanda tribunal may
encounter fewer difficulties in bringing indictments against some
high-level former government officials, its actual number of indict
ments has been low.187 Despite the thousands being detained in
Rwanda prisons, it is not yet clear whether most of the major lead
ers, planners, and organizers of the Rwanda genocide will face pros
ecution or remain "shielded by States or non-State entities."188
In neither region do likely perpetrators truly face a certainty of
international prosecution. In both cases, effective prevention of fu
ture mass atrocities is rendered dubious by the sheer numerosity of
probable culprits and by the international community's equivoca
tions as to their capture and as to committing the necessary finan
cial and other resources to try them.189 Moreover, advocates of
increasing the number of arrests and trials lose sight of a trouble186. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir ofthe
Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 281, 292-94 (1994) (reviewing TAYLOR, supra note
1).
187. See Myers, supra note 171. & of September 1997, of the 21 suspects in custody at
Arusha, many were high-ranking officials in the former Hutu-dominated regime, including
the former Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. See id.
188. Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, at 517.
189. While NATO seems, at this writing, to be assuming, tentatively, greater responsibil
ity for arrests in the Balkans, the likelihood that it will continue to do so remains in doubt as does the effectiveness of any such efforts absent a much more massive military presence.
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some reality: the detention of even prominent leaders does not al
ways deter fanatical followers. A charismatic leader can just as
easily inspire continued violence from inside a jail cell.

In the

Balkans, and even more so in Rwanda, the sheer number of people
likely to have been involved in mass atrocities poses considerable
difficulties for the prospects of deterrence through the criminal pro
cess. Is effective deterrence even possible when such large numbers
have been complicit?190 Even far more stable national govern
ments than are now found in the Balkans or in Rwanda, with con
siderably more effective control over their own territories and with
a longer history of national institutions committed to the rule of
law, have often demurred from conducting criminal trials in the
face of such dilemmas.191
But if deterrence is unlikely, so are the prospects for effective
punishment of culprits or for the rehabilitation for victims. The vin
dication of victims seems scarcely attainable given prevailing polit
ical conditions in the B alkans or Rwanda. Even under the best of
circumstances, only a tiny percentage of the survivors of the mas
sacres in Rwanda and the B alkans are likely to have an opportunity
to confront their tormentors in court, and those who do are likely to
have to settle for the opportunity to present fragmented narratives
before defiant perpetrators unlikely to express remorse.
Similarly, the prospects for restoration of public order, antici
pated by the model of closure, seem meager. In both Rwanda and
the Balkans it seems more probable that former victims and tor
mentors will encounter each other on the street than in an interna
tional courtroom. The small number of international prosecutions
is not likely to forestall acts of vengeance or mob violence as vic
tims come across former torturers and rapists, particularly if unsta
ble conditions continue in either region.

Further, sparse

international prosecutions are not merely the products of scarce in
ternational resources. The difficulty of bringing cases to trial in
either region owes a great deal to the absence of victor's justice.
Thus far in both Rwanda and the Balkans, many survivors and wit
nesses have not been willing to come forward because they con
tinue to live in areas where retaliation remains likely.192 For much
190. Cf. Cohen, supra note 147, at 37 (arguing that the deterrent value of individual pun
ishment in cases involving these politicized crimes remains more uncertain and may be a
great deal less than with respect to conventional crimes).
191. See generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3 (presenting case studies
from around the world).
192. See, e.g., supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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the same reason there has to be profound skepticism that these
tribunals will be able to generate the other goals sought by the
model of closure, including renewed respect for the rule of law and
national reconciliation.
These doubts suggest that the closure model makes erroneous
factual assumptions about the solidarity-enhancing effects of prose
cutions under prevailing conditions in Rwanda and the Balkans.
They imply that closure's advocates were wrong to assume that a
model that is presumed to work domestically for ordinary crimes
can be successfully adapted for international use in cases of mass
atrocity.
But is closure a valid model even within national courts? Post
modern challenges to law's ability to fashion objective solutions or
to tell anything other than politically predetermined stories pose
challenges not known at the time of the Nuremberg trials. To many
people today, the notion of closure through judicial processes seems
the product of an antiquated legal romanticism long subject to
"cognitively relativist, morally nihilistic, and politically anarchistic"
critiques.193
And the new skepticism about law's prospects is not limited to
academe. Even outside the legal academy and its "crits," for per
haps the majority of people in the United States the idea that courts
and lawyers stand as a socially unifying bulwark to protect civiliza
tion seems naYve.194 Many, perhaps most, only rarely view what oc
curs inside of courtrooms as praiseworthy attempts to secure
neutral justice and often as thoroughly calculated maneuvers that
reflect - and sometimes inflame - society's prejudices. Particu
larly in cases involving race or ethnicity, there is pervasive doubt
that all are really equal before the law or that the status of persons
or the ethnic or other affiliations of witnesses, judges, or juries is
irrelevant. There is profound skepticism that a societal consensus
exists with respect to issues of race in the United States, or that our
judicial judgments can either rely on objectivity in the face of it or
generate confidence in neutrally applied justice.
These doubts would seem to apply all the more in the context of
societies as fractured as those in the Balkans and Rwanda. Despite
the premises of the model of closure, confidence in judges and the
law were among the first casualties of mass atrocities in both re193. OsIEL, supra note 6, at 294. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
199-229 (1994) (surveying developments in the "new" legal academy).
194. For one assessment of the reasons underlying the "crisis" in the U.S. legal profes
sion, see GLENDON, supra note 193.
LAWYERS
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gions, and the absence of a shared faith in the shared values of the
law hinders pursuit of closure's goals - at least under the closure
model's terms.

IV.

THE HARD CASE FOR THE YU GOSLAV AND RWANDA
TRIBUNALS

In the wake of the difficulties with the model of closure, are we
to conclude that the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals should cease
operations? 195 If not closure, what is the argument for sporadic in
ternational war crimes trials, often of small fry like Dusko Tadic,
while the majority of wrongdoers in both Rwanda and the Balkans,
including perhaps the majority of those who gave the orders, avoid
international accountability? What justification is there for the is
suance of judgments in future cases that are likely to be as flawed as
the one in Tadic?
As Part III indicates, the Tadic judgment, indeed the very exist
ence of the Yugoslav tribunal, constitutes a provocation. As the
reaction to the Tadic verdict and sentence suggests, the judges did
not succeed in applying a soothing emotional balm; instead, their
judgment inspires unsettling and difficult questions among trial ob
servers and participants on all sides and both within and outside the
region - and not merely among those who are skeptical about ju
dicial claims to apolitical neutrality.
The failure of the model of closure need not lead to the conclu
sion that the Tadic trial or international prosecutions generally may
not advance at least some of the mythic goals of their proponents.
For one year, during the Tadic trial, Serb and non-Serb met in the
relative peace of a courtroom. During this time, both sides were
forced, by the substantive law, to address only issues licensed by
that law. Because of the constraints of the rules of evidence and
procedure - including rules of relevance and decorum - both
sides, including Tadic's Serbian legal defense team, were required
to address relatively narrow factual and valuative inquiries. Both
sides were forced to ask whether events at particular times and
places occurred as described, whether certain witnesses were mis
taken or lying, and whether particular evidence was relevant to
these questions.

195. For an argument that the proper response may indeed be to "[d]o nothing," see
RUBIN, supra note 182, at 183-85.
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Because of the high stakes for the defendant, all trial partici
pants took seriously the need to address Tadic's guilt or innocence
solely through the rhetoric and the tools sanctioned by the law.
The way issues have been channeled at trial also has had effects
outside the courtroom. To be credible, even the trial's critics have
needed to rebut the specific evidence presented. Responsible crit
ics have been made to feel that they need to give their own answers
to questions about TadiC's whereabouts on particular dates and
times. Critics have been invited to give an account of Tadic's dispo
sition toward non-Serbs and to describe his motivations when he
accepted certain political positions. To be credible, competing con
clusions that contradict the judges' factual findings have required
support from a chain of inferences comparable to those on which
the judges relied. If people disagree with the judges' specific con
clusions, they are expected to say why - was it due to witnesses'
composure on the stand, the inadequacies of the paper record, or
some flaw in the bench's logic? They are invited to point to wit
nesses or documents that prove TadiC's alibi or at least to indicate
why, given the prosecution's case, it is unfair to put the burden on
the defendant to prove an alibi at all.
Both the conduct of the trial and the way the judgment was ren
dered discourage, but do not wholly preclude, arguments that all
Muslims lie or that all the Muslim witnesses at this trial did so. Fur
ther, the judges' findings affirmatively discourage as outside the
terms of civil discourse irredentist claims that the beatings, torture,
and executions were justified because the victims deserved it.
There is an attempt to channel even the most vitriolic accusations of
the judgment's Serbian critics into arguments over the political na
ture of the case and the tribunal, the bias of prosecution witnesses,
and the inadequacies of particular trial procedures.
While the judges' admittedly flawed attempts to keep their own
inquiries within relatively less politicized channels do not prompt
closure in the Durkheimian sense of emotional release - as antici
pated by the model of closure - their efforts still invite

reasoned

responses about the law and the application of the law to facts.
Critics are encouraged to indicate where the judges misapplied or
misread the law. But they are discouraged from giving an emo
tional response to what, at least in substantial part, is a decidedly
unemotional, sober - and sobering - account. Irredentist re
sponses that rape or torture is "perfectly consistent with the law of
nations," or that "the law of nations does not exist and is a pack of
lies,'' are discouraged. Such contentions are not within the judges'
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The judges' preliminary findings,

while hardly definitive as demanded by closure, invite heated but
reasoned responses that "comparable" atrocities were committed
by non-Serbs.

These findings affirmatively discourage, as not

within the judges' terms of civil discourse, emotional or righteous
responses, such as a claim that ethnic cleansing is an affirmative
good because "Muslims are unfit to live."
Both in the Balkan region and outside it, the attention given to
the public spectacle that the media billed as the "trial of the cen
tury" 196 and its historic judgment tend to ensure continued dis
course among a variety of observers.

The Tadic judgment will

inevitably be read critically, even by those generally favorable to
the tribunal and its goals - as was Nuremberg's. Feminists and
victims' groups will scrutinize the judgment, as will human rights
advocates generally and the criminal defense bar. Scholars and
practitioners of international humanitarian law will look to see if
the judges got the law right, historians will examine judicial findings
of fact, and advocates of a permanent international criminal court

will be looking for precedents and lessons.
If these international criminal proceedings ultimately assist in
the principal goal of helping to promote social solidarity - both
inside the region and outside it - they will do so because the crimi
nal process - including the rules of evidence and procedure, the
application of the substantive law, and the professional ethics of bar
and bench - enables and facilitates civil discourse in all its respects
and among all these audiences.197 Consistent with Osiel's concept
of "civil dissensus," trials such as TadiC's might better be seen not as
occasions for generating closure but as discursive phenomena that,
if conducted as "effective public spectacle, stimulate public discus
sion in ways that foster the liberal virtues of toleration, moderation,
and civil respect. "198 If so, the value of such trials actually increases
the greater the preexisting hostility or suspicions between the par
ties, since the greater these are, the less apt the parties are to seek
other occasions for dialogue

except when forced to in a court of law.

Particularly in instances like Rwanda and the Balkans, where the
conflicts that gave rise to mass atrocities are far from over, trial

196. See, e.g., S CHARF,

supra

note 3, at xii.

197. Cf. Osiel, supra note 5, at 486-97 (arguing that criminal trials foster "social solidar
ity" by encouraging discourse "with an initially unwilling interlocutor").
198. OsIEL,

supra note 6,

at 2.
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confrontations may provide rare occasions for "public deliberation
over continuing disagreement."199
Further, the nature of legal narratives matters: legal storytelling
is, after all, constructed within a "culture of argument" whose goal
is to persuade.200 Accordingly, trials may elicit a kind of solidarity
premised on
civil engagement in disagreements by way of procedures entailing dis
play of respect for one's adversary, respect that may be entirely pro
cedural (and a matter of rule following) at the outset but that often
tends to grow into something more substantive
if not between the
most unreconstructed of antagonists, then among the larger numbers
of their more moderate sympathizers. There is a kind of solidarity, in
other words, in continuing exchanges that result in the mutual recog
nition that agreement on a question of common concern is strongly
desirable and ultimately possible, even if only at some uncertain point
in the future.201
-

The premise is that legal deliberation, by forcing parties to inhabit a
common legal culture, can help to reconstruct social solidarity
within nonlethal bounds and generate a measure of trust.202
International war crimes prosecutions should not be portrayed
as group therapy designed to generate societal consensus on estab
lished community values. Especially when such trials involve in
flamed ethnic passions that have degenerated into mass violence,
the prospects for such consensus are slim. But the efforts of the
Tadic judges to apply the conscience of the international commu
nity, to affirm what they claim are universal values, at a minimum
forces observers to address whether there is consensus with respect
to any such fundamentals. Perhaps the international community as
a whole does not agree that leaders who seek "ethnically pure" na
tions are guilty of criminal acts. Still, there may be emerging areas
of agreement that certain violent acts directed at the creation of
ethnically homogeneous nations are indeed criminal - or ought to
be. International trials may help facilitate a search for agreement
199.

Id. at 17 n.22.
See Gewirtz, supra note 140, at 2, 5.
201. Osiel, supra note 5, at 499.
202. See OsIEL, supra note 6, at 17 n.22, 38-39. Those who examine law as a rhetorical
process reach similar conclusions. See generally JAMES BoYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow xi,
200.

115-18, 130-31 (1985) (examining the effects of the co=on language of the law, including
the effects of judicial opinions as "socially constitutive literature"). But see Jennifer J.
Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth
and Reconciliation Co=ission as a Model for Dealing with Conflicts of the Past 2 (Jan. 20,
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the retributivist aspects of
punishment undermine the goal of restoring social equality and reco=ending the use of
truth commissions as an alternative application of "restorative justice").

2086

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:2031

as to these acts; perhaps they can even present "moments of trans
formative opportunity" for international and national communi
ties. 203 Such trials, if publicized enough, may provide opportunities
for "social deliberation" and "collective examination of the moral
values underlying public institutions. "204
These tribunals' roles with respect to the question of collective
complicity is a great deal more complex than advocates of closure
seem ready to acknowledge. It is understandable that tribunal ad
vocates want to eradicate the concept of collective complicity root
and branch. Particularly with respect to the Balkans, it seems clear
that at least Serbs and Croats have become adept at using each
group's prior victimhood status - of either Serb victims of "fascist
Croatia" or Croat victims of "communist persecution" - as an ex
cuse to wage unrestricted war against all who bear the stain of col
lective and hereditary guilt for such crimes.205 Concepts of
collective guilt made it easier to justify a war that targeted civilians,
most of whom were not alive at the time of earlier alleged atroci
ties. Tribunal advocates are correct when they argue that the inter
national criminal process, like the criminal process in any liberal
state, rejects such pre-Enlightenment notions of hereditary guilt.
They are right that the Tadic trial, by convicting only Tadic and not
members of Tadic's ethno-religious community or his political asso
ciates, recognizes that individuals are responsible and accountable
only for what they themselves have done of their own free will and
not for the sins of their fathers.
But tribunal advocates are wrong when they go on to suggest
that the Tadic trial or similar trials produce closure with respect to
collective complicity. The findings at Tactic's trial affirm that there
indeed were victims and aggressors, and not merely feuding neigh
bors in a brawl in which all sides were equally guilty.206 In doing so,
203. See OsIEL, supra note 6, at 2.
204. NINo, supra note 36, at 131 (comparing trials for human rights violations to
Ackerman's "constitutional moments"); see also id. at 132-34 (discussing effects of these col·
lective debates); Gewirtz, supra note 142, at 151 (discussing trials as constituting "a central
moral arena for society"); cf. WHITE, supra note 202, at 174 (discussing the "openness" of the
language of the law to new points of view).
29s. See, e.g., Tom Gallagher, My Neighbour, My Enemy: The Manipulation of Ethnic
Identity and the Origins and Conduct of War in Yugoslavia, in WAR AND ETHNICITY:
GLOBAL CONNECTIONS AND LoCAL VIOLENCE 47, 60-64 (David Turton ed., 1997). Indeed,
according to Amnesty International, some victims have been seen as complicit by affiliation.
Thus, Balkan perpetrators have singled out Muslim women allegedly "as a form of retribu
tion because of the perpetrators' presumptions of the actions or intentions of the women's
male relatives." Id. at 62.
206. See generally GENOCIDE AFrER EMOTION: THE POSTEMOTIONAL BALKAN WAR
(Stjepan G. Mestrovic ed., 1996).
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TadiC's trial perpetuates certain types of questions about the culpa
bility of the collective.207 Rather than convincing anyone that we
have managed to capture the only culprits, trials like Tactic's en
courage reasonable questions about the comparative guilt of
groups, including Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
Some believe the resulting debates are detrimental to national
reconciliation. Robert M. Hayden argues, for example, that an ac
cusation of genocide, even when directed against an individual, as
sumes the larger guilt of that individual's society and "works to
establish the collective guilt of those in whose name it is said to
have been carried out."208 Hayden contends that bringing criminal
charges in such contexts, far from individuating guilt, perpetuates
the idea of collective vengeance and self-defense into the next gen
eration.209 Further, attemps to pin the blame on individuals, even
leaders such as KaradZic, only prompts broader inquiries (such as
Hayden's) into likely causes, thereby extending blame to those
Western countries that prevented Bosnia's partition and prema
turely recognized a state that had been rejected by the Bosnian
Serbs and Herzegovinian Croats.210
The argument from civil dissensus starts from the premise that
such questions can only be ducked for so long and need to be raised
if there is to be any real prospect for national reconciliation. It is
based on the proposition that youngsters in the former Yugoslavia

ought

to be encouraged to ask their parents a few years hence,

"What exactly were

you

doing in

1992,

Mom and Dad? Did you

support the people doing these terrible things?"211 Like Hayden, I
assume that war crimes trials keep alive difficult issues of the mean
ing and scope of complicity and that even the conviction of one low
level local torturer implicates, for example, bystanders who chose
to remain silent.212 Like Hayden, I acknowledge that even such tri207. Compare Schrag, supra note 3, at 19 with Diane Johnstone, Selective Justice in The
Hague, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 1997, at 16.
208. Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 743.
209. See id. at 743; see also Susan L. Woodward, Genocide or Partition: Two Faces ofthe
Same Coin? 55 SLAVIC REv. 755, 756 (1996).
210. See Hayden, Reply, supra note 40, at 774, 777.
211. See NINO, supra note 36, at 147 (arguing that such questions need to be part of "daily
discourse" in the context of Argentina).

212. Notions of complicity tend to evolve, as seems clear given ongoing debates about
complicity in Nazi war crimes. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and
World War II, 91 AM. J. lNTL. L. 466 (1997) (arguing that Swiss behavior during and after
World War II was consistent with contemporaneous legal rules governing neutrals); William
H. Honan, Curators as Partners In War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1997, at ES (suggesting
museum curators who "fenced" Nazi trinkets were parties to war crimes); see also Swiss Fed
eral Banking Commission-Independent Committee of Eminent Persons-Swiss Bankers _Asso-
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als can be the start of national debates with respect to what com
plicity means.213 I differ from Hayden, however, in believing that
the ways these issues are addressed matter and that trials can help
channel these debates along legalistic lines. When trials effectively
promote civil disserisus, they encourage discussions about "collec
tive complicity" that focus on what people may have done or failed
to do under the law - and away from hereditary notions of guilt.214
We begin to make the hard case for international war crimes
prosecutions when we reject the premise that the continued discus
sion of unresolved issues is necessarily destructive because it is det
rimental to closure. The argument for the Balkan and Rwanda
prosecutions' prospects for generating national reconciliation may
need to be made on the premise that contentious courtrooms and
ensuing debates are preferable to situations where antagonists in
flamed to kill lack opportunities for civil discourse. Trials and ver
dicts that elicit passionately felt accusations and counter
accusations among neighbors and even within families may be not
only justifiable but necessary in societies as fractured as the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda. As we have seen already in the Balkans and, at a much less bloody level, even within the United States215 judicial verdicts or attempts to prosecute may prompt sporadic vio
lence outside the courtroom. The case for arguing that despite such
risks, trials ought to be attempted is, under civil dissensus, that soci
eties in which such divisive issues are not raised

at least in a court-

ciation: Statement on Comprehensive Claims Resolution Process for Dormant Accounts In
Swiss Banks Dating From Prior to the End of World War II and Announcement on Claims
Resolution Process, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1379 (1997); Switzerland: Decree on the Legal In·
vestigation of the Assets Deposited in Switzerland After the Advent of the National-Socialist
Regime and Decree on the Special Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust, reprinted in 36
l.L.M. 1272 (1997).
213. Continuing a dialogue about tbe prevalence of collective complicity may also be
useful to understanding the urge for continued violence in the Balkans, since encouraging
notions of complicity was itself a conscious tool of, for example, Serbian aggression. See
GENOCIDE AFTER EMOTION: THE PosTEMOTIONAL BALKAN WAR, supra note 206, at 21-22
(describing how Serbian propaganda drew on the alleged collective complicity of Croatians
during World War II); MALCOLM, supra note 82, at 217, 252 (arguing that Serbian leaders
consciously implicated larger numbers in atrocities in order to align their interests with those
of Greater Serbia).
214. This is suggested by the surge in interest in international humanitarian law that the
tribunals have helped to engender, along with a rise in the number of countries that have
adopted statutes under the principle of universal jurisdiction to permit national war-crimes
trials. See Living History Interview with Judge Richard Goldstone, 5 TRANSNATL. L. &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 373, 377 (1995); Meron, Answering for War Crimes, supra note 3, at 7.
215. The bloody aftermath of tbe Rodney King case, see, e.g., Richard C. Paddock &
Jenifer Warren, King Case Aftermath: A City in Crisis, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A4, is
only tbe most well-known recent example within the United States.
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face a greater danger of having these questions vetted in

renewed mass atrocities instead of in more controlled settings.
But if civil dissensus and not closure should be the justificatory
approach, what follows?

(1) Under civil dissensus, what matters is that an institutionalized
process exists to promote discussion of how such events happened
and who should be accountable, not the number of verdicts or indict
ments issued, the number of trials conducted, or even who - lowly
local torturer or high-level government official - stands accused.
As noted, for advocates of closure, the prospect that only trials
of small fry may occur within the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals is
a problem that needs to be corrected as quickly as possible lest clo
sure be undermined.216 Various Nuremberg-inspired arguments,
both philosophical and practical, are used to justify this conclusion.
It is argued that jurisprudential needs for consistency demand that
those who are equally culpable should also face criminal liability. It
is said that the rule of law requires punishing all those who are
equally culpable, regardless of social rank or level of responsibility.
Others, of a more instrumentalist persuasion, contend that the law
requires devoting its scarce resources to those who, because of the
greater numbers of persons they put at risk, their higher social rank,
or their greater degree of education, have greater culpability.217 It
is also argued that punishing the superior official who gave the
genocidal orders or instituted them as policy is more useful for pur
poses of deterrence, retribution, or affirmation of the rule of law.21s
While many of these arguments have considerable force and
merit, it is not yet clear which of these, if any, generate widespread
consensus. From Rwanda to the Balkans, from Argentina to El
Salvador and South Africa, we have considerable evidence that the
peoples and governments of the world, when faced with mass atroc
ities, equivocate not only about whether to impose criminal liability
but also about whom to indict.219 Punishment for mass atrocities is
216. See, e.g., Scharf & Epps, supra note 81, at 659 ("The ultimate test of the Tribunal's
success . . . will turn on whether the Tribunal gains custody of the major planners, strategists,
and co=anders in the war and successfully prosecutes a fair number of them.").
217.
218.

See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 3, at 172-73, 176-77, 296-97.
See id. at 297.
See sources cited supra note 100 (noting U.N. encouragement of

219.
amnesties else
where). For a critical history of such efforts, concluding that criminal prosecutions remain
"rare" and that "[i]naction, amnesties, and pardons" remain the norm, see NINO, supra note
36, at 5-40. See also id. at 118-27 (explaining why this is the case). For more detailed ac
counts involving particular countries' attempts to deal with war crimes, see, for example,
Suzanne Daley, South African Court Approves Amnesty for Apartheid Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1996, at A3 (reporting on the South African Constitutional Court's approval of am-
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and has always been undoubtedly selective at both the international
and national levels. National courts have varied tremendously with
respect to their reactions to violations of humanitarian law by their
own nationals. Selective national prosecutions for such crimes ap
pear to be the norm.220 Indeed, it is arguable that selective prose
cutions that target, perhaps unfairly, small

fry instead of higher-ups

is, as is suggested by the number of small-time drug couriers who
are convicted as compared with drug kingpins within the United
States, endemic to much of the criminal law.
The lack of consensus on such issues should hardly surprise. We
ought to expect debates about whether the failures of political will
that render difficult the arrests of suspects or make impossible the
imposition of sanctions on states who fail to cooperate with the
tribunals make those trials that do proceed illegitimate. Insofar as
we have a choice as to whether to prosecute large or small fish, we
can expect disagreements over the types of collective memory that
are best to preserve as well as the kind of national reconciliation
that is envisioned as a result. The lack of consensus on whom to
prosecute reflects the lack of agreement on these other issues as
well.

As

Robert Jackson

recognized

in

the

course

of the

Nuremberg trials, the decision there to spotlight men who played
important roles in politics, the economy, and the military was in
part intended to send a message that these leaders, and not the av
erage German, bore decisive responsibility.221 It was a strategy that
was intended to absolve the general population on the theory that
such absolution, whether or not grounded in fact, facilitates na
tional reconciliation.222 Those who decide to cast a broader net,
whether in the course of trials or truth commissions, send a differ
ent message about who was implicated in barbarism, and presuma
bly act on the premise that a more truthful collective memory is a
more promising starting point for national reconciliation.
nesty for apartheid crimes); Axel Marschik, The Politics of Prosecution: European National
Approaches to War Crimes, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, supra note 23, at 65 (European
efforts); Gillian Triggs, Australia's War Crimes Trials: All Pity Choked, in THE LAW OF WAR
CRIMES, supra note 23, at 123 (Australia); Sharon A. Williams, Laudable Principles Lacking
Application: The Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES,
supra note 23, at 151 (Canada). But see Robt-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 22-23 (distinguishing
individualized pardons from generalized amnesties); Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Conclusion:
Combatting Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 281, 299 (arguing
that despite the practices of states, there is an "emerging" international legal norm that re
quires states "to investigate, prosecute, and provide redress" for war crimes).

220. See generally

IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

case studies).

221. See, e.g., SA ADAH, supra note 105,
222. See id. at 200-01.
'

at

201.

supra note 3,

at

73-280

(discussing
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Under civil dissensus, it is not assumed that in the international
community as a whole, or within societies where mass atrocities
have recently taken place, there is yet consensus on any of these
issues. Under civil dissensus, we expect further debates concerning
the meaning and significance of selectivity. War crimes prosecu
tions continue to be selective at any of a number of levels. The
Yugoslav tribunal's statute - like Nuremberg's Charter itself - is
limited in scope: it only deals with acts that occurred after

1991 and

only with certain crimes. The Rwanda tribunal reaches a somewhat
longer list of crimes but only insofar as these were committed dur
ing

1994.

Do these limitations - and the underlying failure to

reach anyone guilty of comparable acts at different times - under
mine the legitimacy of punishing those who were guilty in the rele
vant time periods? Does it matter if, as in the Rwanda case, the
temporal jurisdictional limit may be at least partly explained by the
need to prevent prosecution of Tutsis in order to secure the contin
ued cooperation of the current government of Rwanda? Moreover,
the U.N. has seen fit to establish tribunals only for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda but not for Haiti, Iraq, Cambodia, or a
number of other places. Do these failures undermine the legitimacy
of its former efforts, or do we accept the proposition that we must
start somewhere?

International humanitarian law reaches only

some acts, such as indiscriminate targeting of civilians by low-tech
scud missiles, but apparently not, for example, high-tech aerial
bombardment - as by the United States over Baghdad in

1991

-

nor, at least in the view of nuclear powers, the threat or use of nu
clear weapons.223 Are all of humanitarian law and all prosecutions
thereunder thus suspect because they are selective at least along
North/South lines?224
Under civil dissensus we expect further debates concerning
whether the goals of the international criminal process are best fur
thered through high profile trials of major political figures as com
pared to proceedings against more ordinary culprits. While some of
the arguments from the standpoint of deterrence, retribution, and
the rule of law favor the Nuremberg precedent emphasizing trials of
major figures, there are competing arguments emphasizing the
goals of, for example, the vindication of victims or the preservation
of an accurate collective memory.
223. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 Op. I.C.J., reprinted
in 35 l.L.M. 809 (1996).
224. Cf. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical
History of the Laws of War, 35 HAR.v. INTI.. LJ. 49 (1994).
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Some might contend that victims and survivors would derive
more satisfaction from participation in trials leading to convictions
of their actual torturers and rapists; that both groups might find
greater catharsis from seeing such persons in the dock than from
seeing their commanders - usually strangers to those victimized who gave impersonal orders or encouraged such crimes gener
ally.225 From the perspective of collective memory, some may claim
that there is greater merit to devoting scarce resources to punishing
low-level functionaries who actually inflict crimes on other human
beings, since exposing both the banality of such individuals and
their apparent indifference to the pain they directly inflict tells us
more about how such barbarity can become routinized or wide
spread.226 Emphasis on such persons tends to produce accounts of
mass atrocities that provide more satisfactory explanations of their
bureaucratization.221
Whatever else might be said for and against the selective prose
cutions of small fry, there are some practical reasons, from the
standpoint of civil dissensus, in favor of starting with such trials.
First, it may be that civil dissensus works best if deliberations start
small - or at least where both sides do not perceive the political
stakes to be as great. With the political temperature reduced, there
is a greater likelihood that civil discourse will proceed, notwith
standing controversial verdicts or other tensions, as reactions by
even vehement opponents are less likely to be violent or prone to
totally irredentist arguments.228 Trials such as TadiC's permit par
ticipants, including those within the defense bar, to gain confidence
in the procedures and the deliberative process itself. And, under
civil dissensus, it may be that as more trials proceed, as repeated

225. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 223.
226. Such arguments presume, as Carlos Santiago Nino has suggested, a utilitarian theory
of punishment in which trials are deemed a means to prevent crimes or to achieve other
collective societal goals, and are shaped in terms of efficacy in attaining these goals. Under a
more retributivist approach, society as a whole and victims in particular might be regarded as
having a right to punish and to punish all those guilty of commensurate crimes equally. Nino
defends a utilitarian approach under which "nobody has a right that certain persons be pun
ished and, consequently, nobody has a right not to be punished because others are not."
NINo, supra note 36, at 184-85. He defends selective punishment aimed at "efficiently
achieving legitimate goals." Id.
227. Cf. DANIEL JONAH GoLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1997); LUBAN, supra note 21, at 362-74 (critically examin
ing Nuremberg's handling of "bureaucratic" Nazi crimes).
228. Consider, for example, tbe likely Serbian reaction if the first defendant before the
Balkan tribunal had been Milosevic or KaradZic instead of Tadic. Indeed, one tribunal in
sider has suggested that tbe tribunal's prosecutors have consciously avoided issuing an indict
ment against Milosevic precisely because of the political risks. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at
89-90.
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encounters in civil engagement occur, participants and observers
will have greater opportunities to generate more substantive com
mitments and may have more of a personal stake in the tribunal.
Second, such trials provide the bench and bar an opportunity to
test the scope of the substantive rules of humanitarian law, along
with the tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence, and, based on
reaction, work out kinks while the stakes are not perceived to be as
high.229 It is arguably better, certainly from the perspective of
likely political reaction, that the Yugoslav tribunal work out an ap
proach to secret witnesses in a case like TadiC's rather than in a
higher-profile proceeding.230 With respect to the substantive law, it
may be easier to legitimize international prosecutions directed at
the lowly torturer whose acts would undoubtedly justify criminal
liability under any state's law than to bring charges of persecution
against, for example, the infamous operators of Radio Mille
Collines in Rwanda whose acts, though undoubtedly responsible for
many deaths, might be dismissed as "hate speech."231
Third, the pragmatic concerns of litigation may suggest the
bringing of smaller cases, at least initially. Starting with cases like
Tactic's permits prosecutors to build a pyramid of factual evidence
that ultimately leads upward to higher-level officials.232 In addition,
the prosecution gains experience in developing the historical ac
count needed to try small fry in the context of a smaller geographi
cal region - for example, Prijedor in the case of Tadic - and these
accounts can later be used and improved upon when the history of
the entire region proves to be at issue, as it would be in the trial of
Karadzic. From the perspective of civil dissensus, this can only im
prove the credibility of the later judgments issued, as well as the
judges' historical accounts.
Finally, we need to consider the conviction of someone like
Tactic from the perspective of the goal of deterrence. In cases like
229. See id. at 223. While working out particular problems can benefit either the defense
or the prosecution, the removal of ambiguities with respect to procedures and evidentiary
rules tends to be especially crucial to the defense over time.
230. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing controversy about anony
mous witnesses).
231. See generally Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical
Foundations ofInternational Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 1 (1996).
For a survey of the problems involved in ascribing legal responsibility to those who plan or
oversee mass atrocities but do not themselves directly participate in them, see generally
Nmo, supra note 36.
232. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 223; Scharf & Epps, supra note 81, at 662-63. But see
Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 60-62) (suggesting that it might be easier to bring
cases against higher-level perpetrators in some instances).
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TadiC's, prosecutors do not begin, before war crimes indictments
are issued, with an entirely blank slate. Long before the Yugoslav
tribunal was established, the media, individual governments, and
the U.N. Commission of Inquiry had already identified numerous
crimes and likely culprits.233 The question is not whether war
crimes trials will bring to the attention of the public crimes they
would otherwise never hear about; the question is whether punish
ing some crimes and some individuals that are known and that
chance brings to the attention of the public may be important. If
nothing is done about known or rumored crimes or culprits like
Tadic when they are caught, does this not induce or encourage fur
ther violence among those who are not prosecuted as well as among
those seeking vengeance? Whether or not war crimes trials can be
said to deter, the punishment of the publicized crimes of those who
are caught at least prevents their crimes from being cited as an ex
ample of what one can get away with, and, at least for the term of
imprisonment, prevents those convicted from themselves commit
ting more offenses. We need to ask whether, given what is already
known about particular individuals and particular crimes, whether
or not they are small fry, the failure to attempt to prosecute those
whom we can reach encourages or induces violence.234

(2) The civil dissensus model emphasizes deliberation, not a par
ticular kind offorum, national or international.
The international lawyers who successfully lobbied for the crea
tion of these ad hoc tribunals and who are now devoting substantial
energy to the establishment of a permanent international criminal
court generally accept the proposition that such international fora
are only one tool among many for dealing with such offenses, and
that other possible methods include national criminal investigations
and prosecutions and truth commissions.235 They accept the propo
sition that sanctions on perpetrators vary from imprisonment to
fines and duties to compensate victims, from purges from govern
ment employment to other civil sanctions such as bans from polit
ical office or de facto travel restrictions such that those under
233. For a description of efforts to identify cronies and perpetrators prior to the establish
ment of the ICIY, see, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Hu
manitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CruM. L.F. 279 (1994); see also Final Report of
the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, SI
1994/674 (1994) (also available at <http://www.cij.org/cij/commission.html>).
234. See generally SCHARF, supra note 3, at 207-28; Scharf & Epps, supra note 81, at 63840.
235. See, e.g., BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 28-33; RATNER &
ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 139-287; Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 281-304.
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suspicion are not free to leave their home base. Further, they ac
cept that remedies for victims vary as well, and include government
reparations and commemorative measures. At the same time, in
ternational lawyers, especially those within human rights advocacy
organizations, see their role as serving to nudge reluctant govern
ments to accept their duty to prosecute.236
The many reasons advanced for establishing international, as
opposed to national, fora to adjudicate crimes in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia are consistent with the Nuremberg-inspired
goals for these tribunals, as well as the premises of the model of
closure. First and foremost, advocates of these international prose
cutions argue that there is scarcely any real prospect that such
crimes will be fairly, evenhandedly, or promptly prosecuted within
national courts within the regions affected.237 Especially with re
spect to the Balkans, international lawyers have argued that the
choice is simple: for the foreseeable future, it is either international
trials under U.N. auspices or no trials at all.238 In addition, they
have argued that even if national prosecutions emerge, interna
tional fora are preferable and require jurisdictional primacy be
cause international tribunals are more legitimate - that is, less
susceptible to accusations of bias or vengeance.239
Further, since most war crimes charges involve at least the indi
rect attribution of state responsibility, international fora are seen as
more appropriate since they are better positioned to get around the
236. See, e.g., BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE, supra note 39, passim; RATNER &
note 3, at 134; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 5.
237. It is argued that ongoing ethnic or religious tensions continue to make the prospects
of anything other than one-sided show trials untenable. In addition, courts outside these
regions remain unlikely fora for criminal proceedings in the absence of a tangible national
connection. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 159-61, 176-77. With respect to
Rwanda especially, there are also doubts about that nation's capacity to undertake even
handed prosecutions that respect defendants' rights to speedy but full-fledged trials while
relieving victims' fears that the evidence of crimes is rapidly vanishing. See, e.g., DESTEXHE,
supra note 168, at 68-71; RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3 at 154-56; William A. Schabas,
Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Im
possible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523 (1996).
238. Similar arguments have been used to justify the creation of a permanent interna
tional criminal court. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 18, at 707-13.
239. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, § 2 (requiring primacy with respect to jurisdic
tion over national courts); ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 9, § 2 (same); see also DESTEXHE,
supra note 168, at 69; BARBARA I!ARFF, GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL AND PoLmCAL IssuES (1984); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 5; Shraga & Zacklin,
supra note 3, at 505 (outlining arguments that proved persuasive for the creation of the
Rwanda tribunal). For views that appear to be representative of the human rights NGO
community, see, for example, LEScuRE & TRINTIGNAC, supra note 18, at 3-9. Indeed, ac
cording to some of the tribunals' advocates, these tribunals must be accorded primacy even if,
for example, the present government in Rwanda were to ask that international prosecutions
in Arusha be discontinued. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 21, at 497-98.
ABRAMS, supra
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long-standing - if discredited - rule of international law that os
tensibly prohibits one state from sitting in judgment of another.240
Moreover, international fora, when available, avoid the main argu
ment against providing criminal accountability for war criminals,
namely, that trials "may destabilize a still-fragile transitional gov
ernment past the breaking point."241 If the international commu
nity is responsible for prosecutions, there is less danger that the
authority of a new civilian government will be undermined by that
government's own attempt to subject former rulers to legal
process.242
In addition, international trials more credibly advance the goal
of denouncing these crimes as an affront to universal values or to
preemptory norms of international law.243 International lawyers ar
gue that it is only appropriate that these, the most grievous injuries
done to individuals as human beings, should be both judged and
condemned not by any national order or court system but by the
international community on behalf of all humanity.244 For all of
these reasons, the international lawyers involved in the establish
ment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals successfully argued
that, whatever was the response by the relevant national authori
ties, the international criminal process, when triggered, should be
accorded primacy.24s
That many international lawyers should tend to prefer interna
tional processes should scarcely surprise. Solutions are often prede
termined by one's definition of the problem.

If the problem is

defined as the lack of closure, it is easier to arrive at the conclusion
240. See Simpson, supra note 23, at 15.
241. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 9; accord Reisman, supra note 3, at 185-86.
242. Cf. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 9 (discussing the destabilizing dangers presented
when fragile, transitional governments attempt to prosecute former rulers and others com
plicit with the former regime).
243. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
244. To the extent most of the ad hoc tribunals' advocates accept the continued signifi
cance of war crimes prosecutions in national courts, they appear to do so out of deference to
political realities - that is, because few alternatives to such courts appear to exist - and not
because they articulate particular reasons in favor of such proceedings. See Meron, supra
note 119, at 555. But see RA.1NER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 159 (acknowledging that while
national war crimes trials lack the "aura" of international proceedings they are "likely to
have a stronger psychological and deterrent effect on the population," and also are likely to
be less expensive and easier to institute).
245. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 10(2) (setting forth standards for trying person
in international court even after national court verdict); ICI'R Statute, supra note 2, art. 9(2)
(same). It is not entirely clear, however, how the ostensible international legal duty to prose
cute at the national level ought to be reconciled with the duty, under both ad hoc tribunals, to
accord jurisdictional primacy to these international bodies. Cf. Meron, supra note 119, at 576
& n.120.
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that we need to give primacy to processes that invoke universal val
ues and supply definitive results based on the invocation of such
values by the international community. Civil dissensus, by contrast,
because it defines the problem as the need for opportunities for
reasoned discourse, does not insist that an international criminal
forum be accorded primacy over other alternatives.246
On the contrary, the flaws of the Tadic judgment, and of ad hoc
tribunals generally, from the perspective of the model of closure
raise doubts about whether international fora for war crimes prose
cutions should always be preferred, especially where alternative
fora for criminal prosecutions exist.247 The arguments, canvassed
above,248 for the primacy of international prosecutions over na
tional fora, are quite tenuous. First, as the analysis of the Tadic
judgment here suggests, international proceedings are not apolitical
in terms of the discretion of whom to indict or to prosecute; judges'
decisions as to how to render their verdicts - or even whether one
unanimous judgment ought to be issued as opposed to individual
judicial opinions - reflect political calculations. Although interna
tional judges and prosecutors may hold different political agendas
than those involved in national proceedings, both sets of individuals
have them. Nor, for the reasons noted, can international proceed
ings be regarded as denationalized.249 Second, the premise that in
ternational judges have a legal expertise or competence that
national judges lack, dubious to begin with, fails to address con
cerns about international humanitarian law's imprecision (relative
to domestic criminal law) and its origins. It fails to consider how
the application of international criminal law imposes costs on the
credibility and arguable fairness of international verdicts, for vic
tims as well as defendants. Third, the contention that states can
'
more credibly judge each other before international tribunals, while
perhaps significant with respect to the interstate dimensions of the
underlying conflicts in Rwanda and the Balkans, is less relevant
when addressing their significant intrastate dimensions - as from
the perspective of victims. Fourth, the assumption that greater in
ternationalism readily translates into greater success in applying
universal values presumes that international law has been demon
strably better at overcoming such problems as gender bias. As fem246. See generally OsIEL, supra note 6, at 8 n.22 (recognizing the possible role of other
legal fora for civil dissensus)
247. As discussed, this is true at least in the case of Rwanda. See supra section 111.E.
248. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
249. See supra section 111.B.
.
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that

international

humanitarian law is better at protecting the rights of half of the
world's population than at least some states' laws and some na
tional fora.25° Finally, arguments premised on the Security Coun
cil's expansive precedents under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
fail to address skepticism about the representative nature of the
Council or about its ability to create truly independent courts.251
While the lack of realistic alternatives for criminal prosecutions
in the Balkans and doubts about the viability or fairness of
Rwanda's national proceedings suggest that the present interna
tional fora may be the best hope in those places for the encourage
ment of some forms of civil discourse, the existence of these ad hoc
tribunals should not serve as a substitute for considering the virtues
of complementary venues. Freed from Nuremberg as the single in
escapable model, we are better able to put those World War II trials
in context. We need not give international criminal prosecutions
greater significance than they deserve.252 Neither after World War

II nor at any time before have nations relied exclusively, or even
primarily, on international criminal trials to achieve the mythic but
worthy goals that have been articulated for today's ad hoc interna
tional tribunals. Even since World War II, the number of such war
crimes prosecutions has been dwarfed by myriad efforts, not involv
ing the use of the criminal law, in pursuit of deterrence, punish
ment, national reconciliation, et al.253
H we see the accomplishments of the Rwanda and Yugoslav
tribunals from the perspective of civil dissensus, it becomes easier
to accept the possibility that other fora may encourage deliberation
equally well, and that it may be unwise to rely on the international
criminal process to achieve goals that would be more quickly or
better fulfilled through other means. With respect to the Balkans, a
number of legalistic deliberative processes exist, from the diplo
matic level - as through the Dayton peace process and beyondto the World Court - as in Bosnia's case against Serbia and
Montenegro and the latter's counterclaim; from other international
250. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. For related doubts about the need
for international tribunal "primacy," see also Morris, supra note 170.
252. For an early plea urging that American lawyers not get "sucked into this infatuation
with
or addiction to - criminal punishment," see Frank Newman, Commentary, 88 ASIL
PROC. 253 (1994).
253. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 193-215; Terence S. Coonan, Rescuing
History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task of Making Former Torturers
Accountable, 20 FORDHAM INTI.. L.J. 512 (1996); Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 281-92.
-
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organizations - including the Security Council, its sanctions com
mittees, and numerous human rights bodies - to nongovernmental
organizations - such as the Red Cross - and even to national
courts - as with respect to suits seeking the release of documents
or civil actions for damages. Seeing these existing fora, as well as
potential new ones we could devise - such as a U.N. compensation
commission along the lines of the entity now resolving claims
against Iraq - as options along a spectrum of deliberative opportu
nities helps identify tensions among our sometimes conflicting goals
and emphasizes the need to coordinate efforts across venues. It
also helps us to match our goals with appropriate fora.
Some of these other approaches might achieve some of the goals
we now seek to accomplish better than the international criminal
process. The goal of expressing community outrage against the ac
tions of states qua states, for example, might be better suited to
ongoing proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
between Serbia and Bosnia or other possible proceedings before
that court. Particularly since the Yugoslav tribunal can only hear
cases directed against individuals and has no jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression, the ICJ remains the only judicial forum for
making the case that, for example, Serbia, as a government, en
gaged in a conspiracy to wage aggressive war.254 If, as many be
lieve, it is important, for its symbolic value if nothing else, to
establish that states as such can be criminally liable,255 the ICJ may
be the proper forum in which at least to begin to make that case.256
In addition, to the extent that the international community has a
legitimate interest in conflicts such as those within the Balkans and
Rwanda because of the threats they pose to international peace,257
these issues might be more appropriately addressed in the ICJ,
either through contentious cases between states or through requests
for advisory opinions, as by the Security Council or the General
254. See generally FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE BosNIAN PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE at xi
xxi (1996). But see Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of
Yugoslavia and the Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 13 VA. J. lNTI.. L. 385, 394-95
(1993) (arguing that the !CJ is an inappropriate forum to conduct the necessary factual in
quiry to make out the charge of intent to commit genocide).
255. See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, On Prophets and Judges: Some Personal Reflections on
State Responsibility and Crimes of State, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 319, 322-29
(Joseph H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989).
256. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Counci� 90 AM. J. lNTI.. L. 1, 2836 (1996) (describing the role of the ICJ in promoting the international community's expres
sive values).
257. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that "the situation in Rwanda . . . consti
tute[s] a threat to international peace and security"); ICTY Statute, supra note 2, at 1 (label
ing the situation in former Yugoslavia "a threat to international peace and security").
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Assembly. Whatever one thinks of the Tactic chamber's determina
tion of the nature of the conflict in the Balkans, rendered in the
course of that tribunal's determination of whether Tadic can be
convicted of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention,258 it seems
odd to suggest that the best forum for judicial consideration of this
vital legal issue should be a criminal suit against a low-level perpe
trator before a body with a limited jurisdiction and mandate and
not in the World Court.
The goal of establishing an accurate historical record of barba
rism that is untainted by the needs of the criminal law to render a
convincing perpetrator-driven account,259 or by the needs of the in
ternational community to undertake evenhanded prosecutions,260
may be better suited to truth commissions, to take another exam
ple. Despite the many variations among truth commissions estab
lished throughout the world, they are usually designed not to inflict
legal punishment but as "a kind of non-adversarial process of re
establishing democratic justice by exposing the truth of what hap
pened under the dictatorship. "261 As commentators have noted,
such procedures are constructed precisely to provide an accounting
of what has occurred, both because victims demand it and because
recording what has occurred is one way to respond to perpetrators'
assertions of anonymity and immunity.262 Because the process is
putatively nonadversarial, truth commissions can avoid at least
some of the problems that undermine the accuracy of judicial histo
ries. While it might be true that only the crucible of a trial renders
a convincing verdict with respect to the guilt or innocence of an
individual,263 such criminal proceedings may not, for reasons dis
cussed, facilitate the rendering of an accurate account of the scope
and nature of a massacre as a whole.264 There is certainly little ba
sis for any assertion that a criminal trial will invariably draw more
public attention, encourage greater public deliberations, or produce

258. See supra note 42.
259. See, e.g., Osiel, supra note 5, at 520-67.
260. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
261.

SA'ADAH,

supra note 105 (manuscript at 232).

262. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 193-204; Coonan, supra note 253, at
512-13.
263. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 3, 95); Scharf & Epps, supra note
81, at 641.
264. See supra section III.A.
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more significant political - or moral - consequences than truth
commissions.265
Given doubts that the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals will pro
vide victims much in the way of recompense - psychological or
otherwise - certain goals relating to the vindication of victims
might need to be pursued elsewhere - as through civil suits like
the ones brought by a number of Balkan rape victims against
Karadzic in federal district court in New York.266 Whatever else
might be said of such lawsuits,267 the civil cases against Karadzic
are, in some respects, more inviting vehicles for some of the victims
of gender-specific violence in the Balkans. Certainly the plaintiffs'
need to prove damages caused by KaradziC's alleged acts seems
likely to permit a more thorough airing of victims' stories than was
possible in the Tadic case, along with an expression of judicial solic
itude.268 Such a proceeding - or comparable attempts to provide

265. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, Winnie Mandela is Defiant, Calling Accusations 'Lunacy,'
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at Al; Suzanne Daley, Winnie Mandela Killed Youth, Apartheid
Inquiry Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A3 (discussing the worldwide publicity gener
ated by truth commission inquiries into alleged acts by Wmnie Mandela). Even some of the
principal defenders of the Yugoslav tribunal acknowledge that criminal proceedings can be
expected neither to establish the "official" truth nor to "substitute for a commission of truth
based on popular participation." Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 95).
266. See Doe v. KaradZi.c, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), revd. sub. nom. Kadic v.
KaradZic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); see also Mushikiwabo
v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 WL 164496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996)
(default judgment for over $105 million on behalf of five plaintiffs against Rwanda political
leader who "played an instrumental role in the torture and massacre of thousands of
Rwanda's Tutsi minority"). For a brief survey of the requisites of such suits within U.S.
courts, see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 204-11. See also Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Fulfilling the Promise ofFtlartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate ofFer
dinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. lNTI.. L. 65 (1995) (surveying some of the legal issues raised by
these attempts to supply a civil component to Nuremberg).
267. See, e.g., Wtlliam Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: The
Karadzic [sic] Litigation and the Yugoslav Conflict, 14 BERKELEY J. lNTI.. L. 137 (1996);
David S. Bloch, Dangers of Righteousness: Unintended Consequences of Kadic v. Karadzic
[sic], 4 TULSA J. CoMP. & lNTI.. L. 35 (1996); Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDEN J.
INTL. L. 91 (1997); Peter Schuyler Black, Recent Development, Kadic v. Karadzic [sic]:
Misinterpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 GA. L. REv. 281 (1996); Amy E. Eckert, Recent
Development, Kadic v. Karadzic [sic]: Whose International Law?, 25 DENY. J. lNTL. L. &
POLY. 173 (1996).
Of course, other civil suits, such as suits for libel threatened by Wmnie Mandela against
her accusers before the South African Truth Commission, can also present opportunities for
airing these issues and for public deliberation.
268. As suggested by commentative gestures offered by governments, such as
Switzerland's decision to offer token payments to Holocaust survivors, such expressions of
solicitude mean a great deal to victims. See, e.g., Michael Specter, In Latvia, the First Token
of Swiss Remorse: $400, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A4 (reporting victims' reactions to
Swiss payments); see also Coonan, supra note 253, at 545 (arguing for forms of government
acknowledgment of atrocities and not for mere dissemination of information).
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victims with compensation269 - are driven by a need at least to
pronounce on the amount of compensation that in justice is owed to
victims - as opposed to a proceeding seeking primarily to punish
the culprit. Whether or not such civil judgments prove enforceable,
civil suits are less susceptible to judicial timidity for fear of impos
ing ex post facto criminal liability. For that reason, such suits are
more likely to address the many forms of gendered victimization
imposed by ethnic cleansing.210
For these reasons, civil suits, controlled by plaintiff/victims and
their chosen attorneys, and not prosecutors responsive to other
agendas, may also be more effective in preserving a collective mem
ory that is more sensitive to victims than some judicial accounts
rendered in the course of criminal trials.271 Indeed, if studies about
litigants' relative satisfactions with adversarial versus inquisitorial
methods of criminal procedure are an accurate guide,272 it may be
that having greater control of the process, including the selection of
attorneys and the ability to discover and present one's own evi
dence and develop one's own strategy, is itself a value for victims,
and one that is better met through civil suits such as those now
occurring in United States courts.273
For similar reasons, victims, including those of gender-specific
violence,

may

sometimes

find

truth

commissions

or

similar

processes more attractive than international criminal prosecutions.
As with civil suits, truth commissions do not need to be as con
cerned about preexisting limits on definitions of international
crimes, may be better able to expose gender-specific crimes to pub
lic scrutiny, and may provide victims with greater opportunities to
269. See, e.g., Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 290-91 (discussing attempts at civil re
dress); Tetreault, supra note 9, at 204-06 (discussing U.N. Compensation Commission and its
handling of claims by Kuwaiti rape victims).
270. Cf. supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
271. Although Karac!ZiC's decision not to appear in the pending civil suit in New York has
deprived the plaintiffs in that suit of the opportunity to confront him personally during trial,
this need not be the outcome in all such suits. At least some civil suits may provide plaintiff/
victims with the psychological and other relief that has been associated with such courtroom
confrontations.
272. See, e.g., JoHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALTER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67-116 (1975).

A

273. Perhaps this factor should, in addition, lead creators of future international criminal
courts to use less inquisitorial proceedings than the ones now in place for the ad hoc tribunals
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Compare, e.g., GENEVA (Swrrz.) CRIM. PROC. CoDB art. 7 (per
mitting civil action for damages caused by crime to be brought at the same time and before
the same court as a criminal action) with ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 105 (leaving matters
of restitution of property to the initiative of the prosecutor but according third parties the
right to be "summoned" to "justify their claim to the property or its proceeds").
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vindicate themselves and tell their stories.274 In addition, it is not
clear that truth commissions have no deterrent effects. At least
those truth commission reports that identify culprits by name mo
bilize shame against offenders and warn future perpetrators not to
bank on anonymity.21s
It may also be that an emphasis on the need to provide opportu
nities for civil deliberation can help us to modify our list of goals, or
at least refine them to include, for example, the promotion of civil
society. As is suggested by the progress of the

Nunca Mas

move

ment throughout much of South America,276 such truth-telling en
deavors, whatever their flaws, are often bottom-up grass-roots
movements rather than top-down undertakings by either national
governments or the U.N. Such instances of self-help from below
may reawaken individuals' sense of rights and help the governed to
demand the restoration of the authority of
including their judiciary.277

their own

institutions,

It may be that certain deliberative

processes are better at assisting the reconstruction of dvil society
because they empower those engaged in them and
international pressure.21s

do not

rely on

(3) As is implied by (2) above, the model of civil dissensus helps
refine what it is that we expect the international criminal process to
accomplish.
Once we see international criminal prosecutions as only a part,
perhaps not even the most significant part, of the spectrum of activ
ities that have always been pursued to achieve the many goals in
spired by Nuremberg, it becomes easier to prioritize among the
goals that we now insist must be achieved through proceedings
before the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals. At the same time, the
model of civil dissensus helps redirect attention to the potential vir
tues of international criminal prosecutions.
274. See Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 202, at 10-11, 39-40 (making these arguments-in
support of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
275. See generally Coonan, supra note 253; Margaret Popkin, El Salvador: A Negotiated
End to Impunity?, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHrS, s"':pra note 3, at 198.
276. See generally Coonan, supra note 253.
277. Cf. Jamie Malamud-Goti, Punishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledgling
Democracies: The Case ofArgentina, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RioHrS, supra note 3, at 160,
163 (arguing in favor of punishing human rights abuses on the basis that punishment "con
tribute[s] to establishing democracy by reasserting the authority of institutions").
278. For suggestions along these lines, see Colloquy, supra note 159, at 545, 610-11 (com
ments of Paul Hoffman); id. at 614 (co=ents of Neil Kritz); SA'ADAH, supra note 105, at
233-34. If there is, as some assert, an emerging international obligation to defend, protect,
and promote democratic governance, see, e.g., Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 299, interna
tional lawyers themselves should be the first to give priority to such grass-roots efforts.
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World War II's tribunals cannot be credited with achieving all,
or even a significant part of, the goals that were articulated on be
half of their creation;279 and this was not merely because those
tribunals were flawed. Within nation-states, the judicial branch,
traditionally the weakest, is not expected to carry the weight of gov
ernance; this is all the more true internationally.28° Attempts to
make international criminal tribunals carry as much freight as some
of their advocates recommend - whatever the cost - may endan
ger alternative processes and possibly undermine competing goals
for the international community and the United Nations.
As is evident from the discussion above, many of the

Tadic

bench's problems with respect to collective history, politicization,
and fairness to defendants and victims, originate in closure's contra
dictory demands. - International judges might do better if they were
expected to accomplish fewer things and if they were given clearer
priorities among these.
Professor Osiel argues that judges would better accomplish the
pedagogical purposes of war crimes trials, in terms of preserving
collective memory, if they were urged to give this goal a higher pri
ority over the more common purposes of the criminal law, such as
deterrence and retribution. He argues that judges need to make
their hisforical accounts, for the sake of collective memory, "reso
nate more with the public debate beyond the courthouse walls."281
To this end, he recommends, for example, that judges do more to
"contextualize" historical arguments by admitting more evidence
than would be regarded as legally relevant and that they tell a more
"circuitous" story less likely to portray defendants as "'radical evil'
incamate."282 He argues that the resulting historical accounts not
only would be more accurate and nuanced, but also would prove
less likely "to shut off the very dialogue that most needs to be ini
tiated among fiercely h ostile opposing camps of political
partisans. "283
While Professor Osiel insists that the traditional goals of the
criminal law, including supplying a plausible verdict against the de
fendant, are reconcilable with his recommendations, this appears
doubtful. In the Tadic case at least, where the prosecutors' histori
cal evidence was not contested by the defense, producing a more
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See Forsythe, supra note 40, at 421.
OsIEL, supra note 6, at 296.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 297.
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nuanced historical account would have required considerable judi
cial activism, including a demand to the parties that they produce
additional historians or other policy witnesses. Quite apart from
the potential impact on the length of Tadic's trial and its costs, such
activism is likely to be particularly dangerous for judges with such
tenuous legitimacy and is likely to be seen as embroiling the tribu
nal even more deeply in the politics of the region.2s4
We need to consider which tasks are better suited to the judicial
role, given the context in which the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals
are operating, and adjust our expectations of the goals of interna
tional criminal trials accordingly. At its best, a trial like TadiC's pro
duces a plausible verdict as to the guilt or innocence of one
particular individual. Contrary to Professor Osiel's recommenda
tions, we may choose to place a higher value on achieving such a
plausible verdict than on the production of a judicialized history
that more closely approximates scholarly standards, particularly if
trying to achieve the latter threatens the success of the former. But
if so, we need to consider what alternative fora we will rely upon to
preserve collective memory or whether we are content with flawed
judicial histories such as that rendered in the Tactic case. Pace
Osiel, we might opt for flawed historical accounts in the course of
criminal judgments on the assumption that the process of civil dis
sensus will correct bad history but is incapable of truly rectifying a
mistaken verdict against a defendant, at least from the perspective
of an individual who unjustly serves prison time.285
This does not mean that war crimes trials have no role in the
preservation of collective memory. As the preceding description of
the beneficial effects of the Tadic judgment suggests, even the
flawed historical account contained in that judgment is likely to
contribute to collective memory in at least two respects. First, con
trary to the assumptions of the model of closure, an authoritative
account for purposes of collective memory, if it ever emerges, may
take considerable time and will come about through a variety of
actors and sources, including courtroom-generated accounts.
Whether one agrees with such revisionist accounts of the Holocaust
as Daniel Goldhagen's - whose recent portrayal of "Hitler's will
-

284. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
285. For a view that at least some historic judicial opinions have proven effective because
they have not attempted consciously to educate - or accuse - see Sanford Levinson, The
Rhetoric ofthe Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 187, 197-200 (discussing
the absence of historical context in Brown v. Board of Education). See also Robt-Arriaza,
supra note 3, at 21 (quoting Henry Rousso on victim's need for justice over the needs to
teach history or raise consciousness).
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ing executioners" is sharply different from the story conveyed by
the Nuremberg trials286 - the fact remains that Goldhagen's and
other revisionist accounts are as much a product of Nuremberg as
they are responses to it.

Today's collective memory of the

Holocaust owes a great deal to the historical account provided at
Nuremberg, though it is not limited to it. The same is likely to be
true of the Tadic judgment's preliminary findings, a partial render
ing of historic truth that, given its prominence and its source, will
undoubtedly emerge as a point of reference for further histories of
the Balkans and especially of the Prijedor region.
Second, trials such as Tactic's are one way in which accurate his
torical accounts by others are rendered more likely. While the pro
ceedings at Nuremberg presented a one-dimensional and
misleading picture of the Holocaust, they preserved documentary
and other factual evidence, including eyewitness accounts, that
could otherwise have been lost. It is equally clear that the effort to
bring indictments in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, and the
Tactic proceeding itself, has led to the preservation of considerable
evidence, especially oral testimony by survivors. The evidence pro
duced at The Hague and in Arusha seems destined to be part of
subsequent

accounts

of recent

history

in

Rwanda

and

the

Balkans.287
Freed from the need to attempt closure with respect to the full
panoply of Nuremberg-inspired goals, we might articulate other
achievable goals for international criminal processes. Along with
the rendering of plausible verdicts, such trials, if competently done,
might be expected to establish the truth of certain facts that are put
directly at issue in the course of particular trials - such as the
number of beatings, tortures, killings, or rapes committed in certain
detention camps over a certain period - with greater certainty
286. See

GoLDHAGEN,

supra note 227.

287. The significance of preserving such evidence, particularly corroborated physical evi
dence of atrocities and sworn eyewitness accounts that have been subjected to cross
examination, can scarcely be exaggerated. From the Holocaust to the killing fields of Cam
bodia, the first defense of the guilty has been to deny what happened. See, e.g., Seth Mydans,
In an Interview, Pol Pot Declares His Conscience is Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A12
(reporting Pol Pot's denial that "millions" died as victims of the Khmer Rouge). See gener
ally Cohen, supra note 147, at 12-22 (discussing the "truth phase" of state crimes). Establish
ing reliable facts as to the number of victims, the types of crimes committed, and the motives
of perpetrators - the kind of evidence presented in the Tadi6 case - helps to prevent plausi
ble denials and seems even more vital where the prospects of renewed violence continue to
exist. For example, despite the numerous reports of human rights organizations, U.N. bodies,
and the media, there is today considerable debate about whether 20,000 to 50,000 Bosnian
women were indeed raped since 1991 or a few thousand. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 207,
at 18.
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than is possible within truth commissions or within national courts
that do not have the requisite resources. For families of victims,
establishing, in the crucible of a criminal trial, the fate of a particu
lar individual and the circumstances of his or her death has obvious
significance. Most obviously, international criminal trials, like do
mestic ones, help to ensure that some perpetrators are made ac
countable to governmental authority, if not victims as such, and are
punished. Further, once the international criminal process is seen
as part of a spectrum of deliberative venues, it becomes easier to
appreciate that investigations done in anticipation of indictments,
as well as the indictments themselves, have consequences for other
deliberative fora; that merely indicting someone like Karadzic, for
example, because it serves to delegitimize him as a negotiator, may
have an effect on the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations and may,
therefore, itself be worth doing even without the certainty of an
arrest or a conviction.

(4) Civil dissensus demands an examination of a continuing se
ries of exchanges across time. Success or failure is not determined by
examination of one judgment at one moment in time.
Unlike the model of closure, which focuses attention on the
judgment,288 civil dissensus suggests that we evaluate the interna
tional criminal p rocess

that is, that we view the Tactic proceedings

-

as part of a continuing series of events that include, but are not
limited to, the issuance of the judgment and reactions through

1997.

As J.B. White has noted, the language of a judicial verdict is not
self-validating, and its acceptance turns on its appeal to the values
of the community from which it seeks acceptance. As he notes,
such a legal text "does not conclude the difficulties of the real
world, but begins a process, a process of its own interpretation. "289
The alternative to the model of closure discourages evaluative
closure. It implies that we continually reevaluate the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals as trials progress and as conditions in the affected
regions change. This suggests that evaluators need to remain mod
est and accept that at least some of our judgments regarding how
well TadiC's judges did their job remain historically contingent and that even our perceptions of what the judges ought to be doing
may change.290
288. See, e.g., Madise Simons, U.N. Panel Convicts Bosnian Serb of War Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 1997, at Al (suggesting that the judgment and reactions to it would determine
the future of the tribunal).
289. WHITE, supra note 202, at 185.
290. Thus, perceptions of the Balkan tribunal's "anti-Serb" bias may yet change, as trials
against non-Serbs progress. See, e.g., Mike Corder, Stop-and-go trial adds to U.N. war crime
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At the same time,• as Osiel implies, civil dissensus is not pre
mised on moral relativism by either judges, participants, or observ
ers. Civil dissensus assumes that judges will continue to attempt to
articulate community values - but that others will respond and
that these values will evolve as a result.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons suggested, the

Tadic

judgment is not likely to

generate closure with respect to collective memory, the fairness or
political neutrality of the existing rules of humanitarian law as ap
plied to the recent Yugoslav conflict, or the fairness accorded either
Tadic or his victims. For the foreseeable future, it seems likely that
court observers will differ, perhaps vociferously, on such questions
as the accuracy of the judges' version of history (either for Yugosla
via as a whole or the Opstina Prijedor region in particular), on
whether the law condemns all attempts to secure ethnically pure
nations, on whether the judges were equally fair to prosecution and
defense, or on whether victims, particularly women, were given
short shrift during the trial. The prospects for closure with respect
to broader issues raised in the course of TadiC's trial - such as the
degree of "collective complicity" by others - seem even more re
mote. Upon reflection, it is not difficult to see why existing realities
within Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia greatly diminish the
prospects for closure on such issues. International processes that

will probably convict only small numbers of low-level functionaries
and leave many of their superiors untouched do not seem likely to
absolve the collective. Further, as in the Tadic case, other Yugoslav
and Rwanda prosecutions will continue to rely primarily on the tes
timony of live witnesses - persons who will replicate, inside the
courtroom, the religious and ethnic divisions that characterize the
underlying conflicts in these regions. Again and again, Serb will be
pitted against non-Serb, Hutu against Tutsi. In both tribunals, con
victions or acquittals will be based, at least in substantial part, on
credibility findings rendered not by the peers of anyone who was
involved in the underlying conflicts, but by panels of learned judges
who do not include a Serb, a Muslim, or a Croat, a Hutu or a Tutsi.
As suggested by reactions to the Tadic case, perceptions of the re
sulting international verdicts are likely to fall along predictable ethtribunal's woes, AssoCIATED PRESs, June 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4870020 (discussing
new trial against one Croat and three Muslims).
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nic or religious lines. In relatively few instances are convictions or
acquittals likely to generate unified societal consensus.
Nor are skeptics of these proceedings likely to be placated by
these tribunals' procedures or the circumstances of their establish
ment. Both tribunals adhere to a novel, untested synthesis of pro
cedural and evidentiary rules borrowed from both common law and
civil law traditions. The interpretation of these rules divides the
very judges charged with their application.291 And the Security
Council origins of these tribunals con�inue to prompt suspicions,
and not merely among the local governments involved in mass
atrocities, that the international criminal process remains the crea
ture of, and subject to the political agendas of, the superpowers.
There are doubts that these tribunals are enforcing universal values,
evenhandedly applied. The view that both tribunals, created in the
wake of preventable massacres in both regions, are intended merely
to "salvage some scrap of dignity from what remains of Western
prestige,"292 stems from suspicion that these efforts are driven by,
and are certainly not above, politics.293 Under these circumstances
it would be surprising if resulting verdicts drew universal praise or
inspired societal consensus, especially among those who perceive
themselves as targets of these prosecutions, such as the Serbs or the
Hutu.
Both proponents and critics of ad hoc international tribunals
have it too easy. So far proponents have been content to enumer
ate objectives for these tribunals largely without acknowledging the
tensions among their lofty goals. They have been content to stress
the need for international criminal prosecutions only where most
practical; that is, where both the U.N. seems inclined to act and
alternatives to ad hoc international tribunals seem even more diffi
cult. Proponents have generally assumed that when international
tribunals become available, they need to take precedence over al
ternatives, including prosecutions in national courts.

They have

mistakenly relied on a model of closure that seeks to replicate the
strengths of domestic criminal processes while correcting the flaws
of Nuremberg, and have not tried to provide a coherent account of
how international prosecutions are supposed to work in unison with
291. See, e.g., supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
292. Simpson, supra note 23, at 24.
293. See, e.g., Cotic, supra note 78; Forsythe, supra note 40; Hayden, Reply, supra note 40;
Rubin, supra note 40. Even the effort to internationalize the Balkan tribunal's bench has
drawn complaints about some of the nations involved in the judging. See, e.g., Chaney, supra
note 22, at 82 (noting the irony of a Chinese judge rendering verdicts on human rights viola
tions); supra note 131 (noting absence of Muslims on bench).
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other fora, including simultaneous attempts at national prosecu
tions or truth commissions. In response, critics have needed only to
point to how many of Nuremberg's flaws are shared by these tribu
nals and how little agreement truly exists concerning values that are
solemnly touted, but routinely ignored, under international human
itarian law. In short, tribunal advocates have been permitted to
postulate mythical criminal processes and opponents have needed
only to recycle revisionist critiques of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials.
It is time to get off the merry-go-round. Both the proponents
and critics of international criminal prosecutions need to address
seriously the possibility that from Nuremberg to The Hague and
Arusha, war crimes prosecutions do not produce closure but, at
least when effectively conducted, lead to civil dissensus. This im
plies that both proponents and opponents of international criminal
prosecutions need to address difficult questions, including whether
international judges should give priority to the goal of preserving
collective memory or whether at least some of the goals we now
seek to pursue through international ad hoc tribunals are better ac
complished through, for example, national prosecutions, truth com
missions, civil suits, or other processes. A frank appraisal of what
we can realistically expect international criminal prosecutions to
achieve also appears necessary to respond effectively to complaints
about financial and other costs. Tactic's trial cost the international
community some twenty million dollars.294

Without knowing

whether we ought to be comparing this effort to the astronomical
costs of a full-scale military occupation of Bosnia or to the rela
tively modest costs of organizing a truth commission, it is difficult to
say whether such expenditures were worthwhile and ought to
continue.
At this juncture, the definitive case for the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals - and for international trials elsewhere - re
mains to be made. It may be that, over time, neither tribunal will
successfully promote civil dissensus; if, for example, judgments sti
fle rather than encourage reasoned debates or if future trials or in
dictments receive dwindling public notice.295 It may be that
294. See ScHARF, supra note 3, at 224.
295. It is not clear that extensive publicity will be accorded to other trials in the Rwanda
or Yugoslav tribunals. While "[t]hroughout the summer of 1996
live television coverage
of the Tadi[c] trial was carried throughout Bosnia," only a limited Serbian audience with
access to private cable TV transmission had access to it. See id., at 218. While initially the
Tadic trial drew extensive worldwide media attention, such interest dwindled by its end. See
id. at xii, 221; see also Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 67-73) (discussing the denial of
• . .
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alternative approaches, including truth commissions or adjudica
tions in national courts, might be better at promoting civil dissen
sus, at least with respect to some issues, especially if the
internalization of norms is best pursued through forums with demo
cratic participation and legitimacy and not through authoritarian
norms imposed from without. Contrary to what is argued here,
some might contend that civil dissensus reflects a misguided or na
ive trust in the virtues of discourse and is an inappropriate construct
except with respect to societies that ar� already committed to dis
cursive democratic pluralism.296 Or perhaps we may ultimately de
cide that the models of closure and civil dissensus need not be seen
as wholly incompatible and that aspects of both can be usefully
adapted, depending on the circumstances in the societies most di
rectly affected, to promote all or most of the goals we have in mind.
It may be that aspects of both visions need to be pursued through a
multi-pronged strategy, involving legal and nonlegal fora, that as
signs particular goals to the most suitable entity or set of
procedures.
The question of how we justify these or other ad hoc criminal
tribunals is not purely of academic interest. We have, as yet, no
consistent vision of when, if ever, it is appropriate to pursue inter
national criminal trials as opposed to national prosecutions, truth
commissions, general amnesties, pardons, or other measures.297
While some have suggested that international criminal trials must
be pursued once offenses in a region cross a certain threshold of
gravity,29s the argument seems to be premised, tenuously, on unexmedia access for Yugoslav tribunal trials and concluding that its trials are "primarily an elitist
exercise").
296. Some have argued, for example, that a nation defined on ethnic, as opposed to lib
eral terms, does not "take part in intellectual debate" but "enters the political arena and
advances the claim of one nation, its own, against others. It is interested in ethnological,
historical or philological scholarship only to the extent to which these sciences can substanti
ate its ideological assertions and further its political aims." Jakob Rosel, Nationalism and
Ethnicity: Ethnic Nationalism and the Regulation ofEthnic Conflict, in WAR AND ETHNICITY,
supra note 205, at 145, 152. Others, such as Anne Sa'adah, have argued that even liberal
states do not always encourage open discussions on all issues. On the contrary, she contends
that reconciliation efforts in successful democratic transitions involve processes that permit a
"negotiated memory," including efforts to "forgive and forget" that "often stand in tension
with values central to the liberal project." SA'ADAH, supra note 105 (manuscript at 1) (draw
ing from the experiences of postwar Germany and post-Revolutionary War United States);
see also Cohen, supra note 147, at 47 (arguing that social control can be achieved by eradicat
ing memory).
297. See generally Morris, supra note 170; Sheila O'Shea, Interaction Between
International Criminal Tribunals and National Legal Systems, 28 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & PoL.
367 (1996) (noting variety of state statutes to implement anticipated tribunal orders).
298. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 21, at 492-501 (contrasting the South African truth
commission with the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals).
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anrined assumptions about the superiority of international fora and
does not contain reliable criteria for choosing among options. And
even if we had such criteria, difficult issues of consistency arise
given the distinct audiences to which we seek to appeal. From a
victim's perspective, for example, it is not clear why a person who
tortures civilian prisoners in the Balkans merits an international
criminal trial while someone who does the same in South Africa
does not.299
Proponents of international criminal prosecutions need a justifi
catory model other than closure. This is especially the case since,
under the premises of closure, international criminal proceedings
that fail to meet the preconditions for generating societal consensus
do not just fail, they

undermine

the goals that have been used to

justify the creation of international criminal tribunals. The apostle
of closure argues that unless the present ad hoc tribunals are given
the resources to accomplish closure on all fronts - with respect to
the societies affected, the international community, possible de
fendants, and victims - they should be shut down, as they only
undermine the rule of law, along with all the other goals, from de
terrence to national reconciliation.300 There is, therefore, consider
able risk that those who live by the model of closure may force ad
hoc tribunals to perish by it.

299. Cf. id. (arguing that the "human rights abuses" in South Africa should be the subject
of Nuremberg-style trials, while the serious crimes within the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
warrant criminal liability). As TadiC's trial suggests, many of the trials at The Hague are
likely to involve charges of violations of the laws and customs of war and not genocide; many
are likely to involve offenses that are arguably no worse than many now being revealed to the
South African Truth Commission.
300. These concerns appear repeatedly among advocacy pieces on behalf of the tribunals,
both in academe and in the popular press, and are evident even among the tribunals' judges
and prosecutors. See Richard J. Goldstone, No Justice in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at
A17; Meron, Answering for War Crimes, supra note 3, at 2-3. In the summer of 1997, Chief
Judge Cassese suggested that the Balkan tribunal's judges should resign en masse in protest
unless there were attempts to bring Karac!Zic and Mladic to The Hague. See SCHARF, supra
note 3, at 225.

